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COMMENT
RICO and the First Amendment:
Alexander v. United States
Bruno C. Bier*
INTRODUCTION
The pervasiveness of sexually explicit material has generated
controversy both inside and outside legal circles.' Even as the
debate over pornography2 continues, the growth of the adult enter-
* J.D. Candidate, 1996, Fordham University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professor Thane Rosenbaum for his assistance and guidance, my family for their contin-
ued support, and Cynthia Newhart for her encouragement.
1. See, e.g., SUSAN M. EASTON, THE PROBLEM OF PORNOGRAPHY (1994); EDWARD
DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERYWHERE (1992); CATHERINE MACKINNON, TOWARD
A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON POR-
NOGRAPHY, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT (1986); ANDREA DWORKIN, PORNOG-
RAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981); HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC
MORALITY: CENSORSHIP IN A LIBERAL SOCIETY (1970); THE REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SION ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY (1970); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (1966); TERRENCE J. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT AND OBSCENITY
(1963); LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960).
2. Pornography is to be distinguished from obscenity. Pornography is derived from
the Greek words "porne" meaning "harlot" and "graphos" meaning "writing." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1986). The word is defined as "1: a descrip-
tion of prostitutes or prostitution 2: a depiction (as in writing'or painting) of licentiousness
or lewdness: a portrayal of erotic behavior designed to cause sexual excitement." Id.
Obscenity, on the other hand, is derived from the Latin word "obscaenus," "ob" meaning
"to" and "caenum" meaning "filth." Id. "Obscene" is defined as "la: disgusting to the
senses ... b: grossly repugnant to the generally accepted notions of what is appropriate
... 2: offensive or revolting as countering or violating some ideal or principle . I..." Id
However, as used in this Comment, obscenity is a legal term of art defined as books,
films, etc., which, when judged by contemporary community standards appeal to prurient
interests; describe sexual conduct in a patently offensive manner; and lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Thus,
pornography and obscenity are not synonymous terms. See id. at 18 n.2. Obscenity
receives no First Amendment protection. Id. at 36. However, pornography that has not
been judged obscene is ostensibly protected speech. See infra part lI.B.
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tainment industry remains unchecked.3  Federal and state govern-
ments, responding to its expansive growth, have attempted to regu-
late and, at times, eradicate the pornography industry.4
The government has used a variety of methods in its attempts
to control pornography, including criminal laws, civil injunctions,
licensing schemes, censorship boards, declaratory judgments, nui-
sance abatement laws and zoning ordinances.5 With the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute ("RICO" or the
"Act"),6 prosecutors gained yet another weapon in their arsenal
against purveyors of obscenity.7
Congress enacted RICO to give law enforcement officials an
effective means of combatting organized crime. Sponsors of
RICO recognized that organized crime enhanced its power by using
illegal money and violence to infiltrate legitimate businesses and
labor unions. 9 Lawmakers and law enforcement officials realized
3. In New York City, for example, there were only 9 adult entertainment establish-
ments in 1965. The number of these establishments grew to 151 in 1976 and 177 in
1993. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1995, at B1.
4. See John J. O'Donnell, Note, RICO Forfeiture and Obscenity: Prior Restraint or
Subsequent Punishment?, 56 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1101-02 (1988). O'Donnell pro-
vides a prescient pre-Alexander discussion of the prior restraint-subsequent punishment
debate in the context of RICO laws.
5. See generally, FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY 197, 228-46
(1976); O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1102 & nn.6-9.
6. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941-48
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994)).
7. See generally O'Donnell, supra note 4; Ana Maria Main, Comment, RICO's
Forfeiture Provision: A First Amendment Restraint on Adult Bookstores, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 419 (1988) (concluding that RICO's forfeiture provision is a prior restraint on the
dissemination of nonobscene materials).
8. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 922-23. The Statement of Findings and Purpose
declares that: "It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime
... by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activi-
ties of those engaged in organized crime." Id.
9. Testimony of Sen. John L. McClellan, Chairman, Criminal Law and Procedures
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 115 CONG. REC. 5874 (1969). Sen.
McClellan stated:
With its extensive infiltration of legitimate business, organized crime thus poses
a new threat to the American economic system .... Closely paralleling its
takeover of legitimate businesses, organized crime has moved into legitimate
unions. Control of labor supply through control of unions can prevent the
unionization of some industries or can guarantee sweetheart contracts in others.
[Vol. 6:369
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that a means of combatting organized crime's infiltration into legit-
imate business enterprises was necessary to bring down these vast
criminal empires and protect the legitimate businesses threatened
by them.10 Hence, Congress provided RICO with stringent forfei-
ture provisions that struck at the heart of organized crime by going
after its economic base.l' RICO has proven to be a potent weapon
in law enforcement's ongoing war with organized crime. 2
Emboldened by RICO's successes, lawmakers sought to expand
RICO's scope in order to more effectively prosecute distributors of
sexually explicit materials. 3 In 1984, Congress amended RICO to
include state and federal obscenity violations as predicate acts trig-
gering RICO.' 4 Citing a nexus between organized crime and the
pornography trade, Senator Jesse Helms, the amendment's sponsor,
argued that the amendment would allow prosecutors to combat
organized crime and pornography. 5
It provides the opportunity for theft from union funds, extortion through the
threat of economic pressure, and the profit to be gained from the manipulation
of welfare and pension funds and insurance contracts.
Id.
10. See id. Senator McClellan stated, in introducing Senate Bill 30, that "[organized
crime] now dominates the fields of jukebox and vending machine distribution. Laundry
services, liquor and beer distribution, nightclubs, food wholesaling, record manufacturing,
the garment industry and a host of other legitimate lines of endeavor have been invaded
and taken over." Id. The Senator added:
Control of business concerns has been acquired by the sub-rosa investment of
profits acquired from illegal ventures, accepting business interests in payment
of gambling or loan shark debts, but, most often, by using various forms of
extortion .... When organized crime moves into a business, it usually brings
to that venture all the techniques of violence and intimidation which it used in
its illegal businesses.
Id.
11. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 76-78 (1969); see also G. Robert
Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 261 (1982) (providing a thorough account of RICO's legisla-
tive history). Professor Blakey was Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Crimi-
nal Laws and Procedures in 1969-70 and was instrumental in the drafting of RICO.
12. See O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1103.
13. See 130 CONG. REC. 844 (1984) (statement of Sen. Helms).
14. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1837, 2143 (1984) (codified as 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(a) (1994)). "Predicate acts" refer to those crimes constituting "racke-
teering activity" under RICO § 1961(1). Id.
15. See 130 CONG. REC. 844 (1984).
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The Supreme Court upheld RICO's use in obscenity prosecu-
tions in Alexander v. United States.'6 The Court held that the ap-
plication of RICO in. an obscenity conviction, and the resulting
forfeiture of the defendant's adult entertainment business, which
included his entire inventory of books, magazines and films that
had not been judged obscene,17 did not contravene the First
Amendment. 8 In upholding the forfeiture, the majority rested
much of its analysis on the prior restraint doctrine.' 9 The doctrine
is a First Amendment bar against government regulations that seek
to suppress speech before publication (i.e., licensing schemes and
injunctions), as opposed to statutes that punish speech subsequent
to publication.2 ° The Court distinguished RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions as a subsequent punishment; hence, the seizure of Alexan-
der's inventory did not violate his First Amendment rights.2
While the Court examined RICO's forfeiture provisions in rela-
tion to the speaker's First Amendment rights, it failed to consider
the forfeiture in relation to the audience's First Amendment rights.
In so doing, the Court disregarded the very justification of earlier
cases which held that such massive seizures contravened the First
Amendment. Namely, these seizures were held to be unconstitu-
tional because they interfered with the public's right of access to
presumptively protected materials.22
This Comment analyzes Alexander v. United States in the con-
text of prior Supreme Court cases dealing with obscenity and the
First Amendment. Part I examines RICO, its history, and punitive
sanctions. Part II provides a brief analysis of the Supreme Court's
post-1950s obscenity cases. Part III provides a historical sketch of
the prior restraint doctrine and an overview of the debate surround-
ing the doctrine. Part IV discusses the Court's analysis in Alexan-
der. Part V offers criticisms of the Alexander Court's decision, as
well as an alternative analysis that focuses on the public's right of
16. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
17. Id. at 2769.
18. Id. at 2776.
19. See infra part IV.B.
20. See infra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
21. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772-73.
22. See infra part Il.B.
[Vol. 6:369
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access to protected materials. This Comment concludes that the
prior restraint-subsequent punishment distinction should not be
dispositive in analyzing government seizures of materials that im-
plicate the First Amendment. Rather, an examination of the sei-
zure's effects on the rights of both the speaker and the audience
may be a more useful tool in determining when government actions
have unduly encroached upon First Amendment liberties.
I. RICO'S HISTORY AND APPLICATION
Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970.23 Congress' intent was clear: RICO was an
attempt to attack the economic roots of organized crime.24 Congress
sought to sever organized crime from its power base by confiscat-
ing the defendant's assets and removing the defendant from the
corrupted enterprise.25
RICO prohibits four types of activity: (a) using or investing any
income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity in the acqui-
sition of an enterprise;26 (b) using a pattern of racketeering activity
23. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 941-48.
24. See S. REP. No. 617, supra note 11, at 79. The Senate report on the bill stated:
What is needed here ... are new approaches that will deal not only with indi-
viduals, but also with the economic base through which those individuals consti-
tute such a serious threat to the economic well-being of our Nation. In short,
an attack must be made on their source of economic power itself, and the attack
must take place on all available fronts.
Id.
25. See id.; see also 116 CoNG. REC. 591 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
Sen. McClellan stated that "Title IX attacks the problem by providing a means of whole-
sale removal of organized crime from [legitimate] organizations, prevention of their return
and, where possible, forfeiture of their ill-gotten gains." Id.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, di-
rectly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within
the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly
or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acqui-
sition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment,
and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the
19951
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to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise; 27 (c) conducting
or participating in an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeer-
ing activity;28 and (d) conspiring to violate any of these provi-
sions.29 Most RICO prosecutions are brought under § 1962 (c) and(d). 30
To prove a violation of § 1962(c), the following elements must
be shown: "(1) that an enterprise exists; (2) that the enterprise
affected interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant was employed
by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that the defendant partici-
pated either directly or indirectly in the conduct of the affairs of
the enterprise; and (5) that the defendant participated through a
pattern of racketeering activity.'
issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsec-
tion if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his
immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern of racketeering
activity or the collection of any unlawful debt after such purchase do not
amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one
class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more
directors of the issuer.
Id.
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (1994) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the
activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1994) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1994) provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to
conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section."
Id.
30. Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 815
(1990) (citing Hearings on H.R. 1046 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (statement of Prof. Gerard E.
Lynch)).
31. Id. at 815 (citing United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1323 (11th Cir.
1982)).
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The Act's definition of "racketeering activity" enumerates
"those crimes most often associated with organized crime, especial-
ly those associated with the infiltration of legitimate organiza-
tions., 32 These crimes, characterized as "predicate acts," trigger the
application of the RICO statute. 33  The Act defines "pattern of
racketeering activity" as the commission of at. least two predicate
acts within a ten year period.34
The RICO statute as enacted did not include obscenity viola-
tions as predicate acts.35 Congress subsequently included "dealing
in obscene matter" to the list of predicate acts as an amendment to
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984.36 Senator Jesse
Helms offered the amendment from the Senate floor in order to
eliminate both "[t]he scourge of widespread pornography" and the
"heavy involvement of organized crime in the pornography trade." 37
32. S. REP. No. 617, supra note 11, at 158. These crimes include murder, kidnap-
ping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, sale and distribution of narcotics,
counterfeiting, usury, mail fraud, bankruptcy fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud, and
obstruction of justice. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
35. See Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. at 941.
36. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1976, 2143 (1984).
37. 130 CoNG. REC. 844 (1984) (statement of Sen. Helms) [hereinafter Statement of
Sen. Helms]. Senator Helms' remarks upon the introduction of the amendment were as
follows:
[A]nyone living in the United States in 1984, who has his or her eyes open,
knows that we are experiencing an explosion in the volume and availability of
pornography in our society. Today it is almost impossible to open mail, turn
on the television, or walk in the downtown areas of our cities, or even in some
suburban areas, without being accosted by pornographic materials. The sheer
volume and pervasiveness of pornography in our society tends to make adults
less sensitive to the traditional value of chaste conduct and leads children to
abandon the moral values their parents have tried so hard to instill in them.
In essence, pornography degrades the dignity and worth of human beings
by presenting a false picture of human sexuality. It holds sexuality out as an
end in itself, totally removed from its proper and normal place as a means in
marriage for conjugal love and the procreation of children. Pornography de-
means because it rejects the true meaning of sexuality.
And, Mr. President, the true meaning is the one that is reflected in our
most ancient cultural tradition. It is the one that binds human sexuality insepa-
rably to marriage and sees its fruit in the family. This is the proper context for
1995]
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The amendment was subsequently adopted without debate and
made a part of the act.38
Once convicted of RICO violations, a defendant is subject to its
especially harsh sanctions: fines of twice the gross profits or pro-
ceeds derived from the illegal activity, a prison term of up to 20
years, or both.39 Separate from the fines it imposes, RICO provides
for forfeiture of interests obtained through violations of RICO,
property that affords the defendant a source of influence over the
racketeering enterprise, and any proceeds directly or indirectly
obtained from racketeering activity.40 These forfeiture provisions
sexuality, and when it is removed from such context, injury is invariably done
both to the individuals involved and to society at large.
Mr. President, in the last decade the pornography industry has grown to
mammoth proportions. Currently profit from this material is estimated to be the
third largest source of income for organized crime after drugs and gambling.
In 1984, with the heavy involvement of organized crime in the pornogra-
phy trade, it seems only appropriate that RICO include the crimes of "dealing
in obscene matter" already in State and Federal law. Such crimes would then
not only be State or Federal crimes in themselves, but they would also be RICO
crimes, thereby opening the door to Federal investigation of an area of substan-
tial interest to the criminal community.
The additions to RICO contemplated by my amendment would have a
threefold effect: One, they will enable Federal prosecutors to expand their
investigations into the involvement of organized crime in the illicit sex industry;
two, they will make prosecutions possible along the chain from adult theater,
peepshow, or bookstore employee to the owner, distributor, financier, and pro-
ducer of obscene materials; and three, they will send a strong warning to orga-
nized crime -and obscenity profiteers that the exploitation of women, children,
and others through pornography will not be tolerated by the American people.
Id.
38. Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1020, 98 Stat. 1976, 2143 (1984); See also Alexander, 113
S. Ct. at 2778 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1974). The statute also provides for a term of life in prison
for a violation "based on a racketeering activity for which the maximum penalty includes
life imprisonment." Id.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1964. RICO forfeiture differs from historical notions of forfeiture
in American law. See O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1108 & n.43. The vast majority of
forfeiture provisions are in rem. H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (1984),
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3376. In rem forfeiture is based upon a legal
fiction that considers the property to be the defendant, and if it is found guilty it may be
forfeited. Id. RICO, on the other hand, imposes a criminal, in personam punishment on
[Vol. 6:369
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play a significant role in RICO prosecutions.4' Moreover, § 1964
provides civil remedies to remove the defendant from the corrupted
enterprise and prevent future violations.42 Commentators have
noted that the civil provisions of § 1964 may prove to be the most
significant aspect of RICO's remedial provisions, as "their flexibili-
ty allows the court to fashion the remedy that will best remove the
defendant from the enterprise. 43
II. OBSCENITY AND THE CONSTITUTION
A brief overview of the relevant Supreme Court rulings on the
seizure of sexually explicit materials is offered for comparison with
RICO's forfeiture provisions. A review of the Court's holdings in
these cases reveals a shift in its inquiry. The line of seizure cases
is characterized by a move away from an analysis of the effects
such seizures have on the availability of publications in favor of an
analysis concerned more with the proscription's form. This change
in the Court's focus culminated in Alexander v. United States,
where the Court was called upon to address the constitutionality of
RICO's forfeiture laws, as applied to the forfeiture of sexually
explicit materials that had not been judged obscene.
a guilty defendant. Id. The defendant, therefore, must forfeit the total amount of his
proceeds from racketeering activity and all of his interests in the illegal enterprise. 18
U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1994). Consequently, RICO's forfeiture provisions afford the govern-
ment greater efficiency in seizing a wider spectrum of assets. H.R. REP. No. 1030, supra,
at 194-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 3376-79. RICO's forfeiture provisions
allow for seizure of all the assets in one proceeding, as opposed to requiring separate
proceedings for each parcel of property seized. id. O'Donnell lists a wide spectrum of
assets that have been attached under RICO's provisions. O'Donnell, supra note 4, at
1108-09. For instance, money or property representing the proceeds from racketeering,
a job, a salary or bonus may constitute attachable "interests." id. at 1109.
41. See O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1107 (citing United States Department of Justice,
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): A Manual for Federal Prosecu-
tors 76 (1985)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a); see also O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1107.
43. O'Donnell, supra note 4, at 1107 (citing Blakey, supra note 11, at 261); see also
115 CoNG. REC. 6993-94 (1969) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
1995]
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A. Substantive History
Modem obscenity law begins with Roth v. United States.44 Ap-
plying First Amendment standards to obscenity for the first time,
the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of the defendant for
mailing obscene circulars and an obscene book.45 Justice Brennan,
writing for the Court, held that material was obscene if "to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the
dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to pruri-
ent interest. ' '46 The Court further held that material adjudged ob-
scene received no constitutional protection. The Court stated:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social impor-
tance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they
encroach upon the limited area of more important interests.
But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.47
While the scope and definition of obscenity has since been modi-
fied, Roth continues to represent the "cornerstone of American
44. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). For a historical examination of English and American
obscenity laws see SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 1-48.
45. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 480, 494; see also SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 33. The
materials at issue could hardly have been considered "literary classics." Titles included
Wild Passion; Wanton by Night; and Sexual Conduct of Men and Women. Id. (citing J.
KILPATRICK, THE SMUT PEDDLERS 81-85 (1960); T. MURPHY, CENSORSHIP: GOVERNMENT
AND OBSCENITY 21-24 (1963)).
46. Roth, 354 U.S. at 489.
47. Id. at 484. Brennan's view echoed the Court's holding in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In upholding the criminal libel conviction of a defen-
dant who denounced the city government as "damned Fascists," the Court stated:
There are certain well defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the
prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene .... It has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that
may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.
Id. at 571-72.
[Vol. 6:369
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obscenity law. ' 48
Subsequent decisions saw the Court narrow the permissible
scope of obscenity regulation, 49 culminating in Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts.50 In Memoirs, the Court struck down an in rem proceed-
ing against John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, popu-
larly known as Fanny Hill. Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
proffered the Roth definition as modified by subsequent cases. For
material to be found obscene, three elements were necessary: "(a)
the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a
prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive be-
cause it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the
description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material
is utterly without redeeming social value."'5' Thus, the Memoirs
definition differed from Roth in a number of respects. First, the
Court required the government to establish each individual element
before the material could be found obscene.52 Second, a finding
that the material was "patently offensive" had now become a re-
quirement.53 Finally, the "utterly without redeeming social value"
standard was made a formal requirement.
5 4
The Supreme Court did not address the substantive scope of
obscenity again until Miller v. California.55 The Miller Court held
that material was obscene if it met the following criteria:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary
community standards" would find that the work, taken as a
whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
48. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 39.
49. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959);
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964); see also SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 40-44.
50. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
51. Id. at 418.
52. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 43.
53. id.
54. Id.
55. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
1995]
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ary, artistic, political, or scientific value.56
The first part of the Miller test reaffirmed the Roth standard. More-
over, the Court added two further requirements. Namely, a due
process requirement was added, as the "patently offensive" sexual
conduct must be specifically defined by the applicable state law."
The second new requirement replaced the "utterly without redeem-
ing social value" standard of Memoirs with a less rigorous stan-
dard. 8 This standard required only that "the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
59
.While decisions after Miller have addressed various aspects of
obscenity, none have changed the substantive scope of obscenity's
definition as enunciated in Miller.
60
B. Procedural History
The Supreme Court has consistently required more stringent
procedural safeguards in instances where the government seeks to
suppress speech.6' In the area of obscenity, this due process re
quirement demands that an adversary hearing be held in order to
determine whether the materials sought to be suppressed are legally
obscene.62
The Court first addressed the issue of proper procedural safe-
guards in Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown.63 The Court upheld an
56. Id. at 24.
57. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 46-47.
58. id. at 47.
59. Id. The Miller standard is a less rigorous standard, first, because the value of the
work "must be more predominant, more serious and more pervasive throughout the entire
work." Id. at 140. Conversely, under Memoirs, the work needed only a "modicum of
social value." Id. (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418-20). Second, the Miller Court
rejected the "ambiguous concept of 'social importance."' id. at 141 (quoting Miller, 413
U.S. at 25 n.7). In its place, the Miller Court provided what seems to be an exhaustive
list. Id. at 142. "It is not any serious value that is relevant, but only serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id.
60. See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding
that Miller is still the applicable standard).
61. SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 206.
62. Id. at 206-27 (discussing case law setting out due process requirement of an
adversary hearing).
63. 354 U.S. 436 (1957); see also SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 206-07 (discussing the
procedural safeguards required by Kingsley Books).
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injunctive scheme that allowed New York state to enjoin the sale
or distribution of obscene publications, as well as the seizure of
such publications.64 Rejecting the argument that the injunction
amounted to a prior restraint, the Court held that "the phrase 'prior
restraint'. is not a self-wielding sword ' 65 and the proper test was an
analysis of "the operation and effect of the statute in substance. '"66
The Court noted extensive procedural safeguards were in place,67
as the injunctive scheme required a full adversary hearing on the
issue of obscenity soon after the proceedings were initiated.68
The Court returned to the issue of procedural safeguards in
Marcus v. Search Warrant.69 In Marcus, the Court struck down
Missouri's separate statutory scheme for the search and seizure of
obscene material. 70 The statute provided that a judge could issue
a warrant for any obscene materials upon receipt of a sworn com-
plaint.71  The proceeding was ex parte;72 however, an adversary
hearing was required before final destruction of the materials could
be achieved.73 Nonetheless, there was no time limit for when the
court was required to announce its decision.7 The Court held that
"Missouri's procedures . . lacked the safeguards which due pro-
cess demands to assure nonobscene material the constitutional pro-
tection to which it is entitled. 75
64. Kingsley Books, 354 U.S. at 438-41.
65. Id. The Court further stated:
Nor can [the phrase "prior restraint"] serve as a talismanic test. The duty of
closer analysis and critical judgment in applying the thought behind the phrase
has thus been authoritatively put by ... [Professor Freund]: "What is needed,"
writes Professor [Freund], "is a pragmatic assessment of its operation in the
particular circumstances. The generalization that prior restraint is particularly
obnoxious in civil liberties cases must yield to more particularistic analysis."
Id. at 441-42.
66. Id. at 441 (quoting Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1930)).
67. Id. at 440-41.
68. Id.
69. 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
70. Id. at 718-19.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 720.
73. id.
74. Id. at 721.
75. Id. at 731.
1995]
382 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
Specifically, the Court cited a number of objections to the Mis-
souri statute. First, the warrants were issued on the conclusory
assertions of the police officer, without judicial scrutiny of the
materials to be seized.76 Second, in effectuating the seizure of the
materials, the officers were allowed absolute discretion to seize
what they adjudged obscene.77 Third, the statute authorized the
seizure of all copies of the materials prior to a hearing on the ques-
tion of obscenity.78 Finally, the Missouri statutory scheme had no
limitation on the time within which the presiding judge was re-
quired to render a decision.79 Thus, the statute was constitutionally
infirm, because "there was no step in the procedure before seizure
designed to focus searchingly on the question of obscenity."8 ° The
Court required that there be a full adversary hearing to determine
whether the materials were obscene before the state effected a
massive seizure of this type.81 The Court reasoned that such a full
adversary hearing ensured that "nonobscene publications, entitled
to constitutional protection, [would] reach the public. 82
In A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,83 the Supreme
Court, again striking down a massive seizure of books, held that
such seizures violated the public's right of access to nonobscene
books.84 In A Quantity of Books, the statute authorizing massive
seizure of books alleged to be obscene was similar to the statute
struck down in Marcus.85 However, the statute in this case limited
the discretion of those officials effectuating the seizure and re-
76. Id. at 731-32.
77. Id. at 732.
78. Id. at 736.
79. Id. at 737.
80. Id. at 732. The Court noted here that over two-thirds of the titles seized were
ultimately judged not to be obscene; included among those titles were: The Dawn of
Rational Sex Ethics; Your Affections, Emotions and Feelings; Sexual Impotence, Its Caus-
es and Treatments; and Syphilis, A Treatise for the American Public. Id. at 732-33.
81. Id.; see also SCHAUER, supra note 5, at 208 (discussing the Court's requirement
of a full adversary hearing).
82. Marcus, 367 U.S. at 736.
83. 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
84. Id. at 213.
85. Id. at 209-11.
[Vol. 6:369
RICO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
quired a prompt judicial determination as to their obscenity.86 The
prosecutor, in an effort to comply with Marcus, listed all titles to
be seized.87 Moreover, the prosecutor submitted seven novels in an
ex parte hearing before a district judge, who ruled that the books
"appear[ed] to be obscene literature" and gave "reasonable grounds
to believe" all the novels listed in the Information were obscene.8"
Hence, the sheriff carried out the warrant, seizing all the copies of
only those titles listed in the warrant.89 After a hearing in which
the novels were adjudged obscene, the court ordered the materials
to be destroyed.9°
The Supreme Court, however, overturned the order, holding that
a seizure of all the copies of the specified titles before the defen-
dant was afforded an adversarial hearing violated the First Amend-
ment.9' Justice Brennan noted that "[a] seizure of all copies of the
named titles is indeed more repressive than an injunction prevent-
ing the further sale of the books. 92 As in Marcus, the Court re-
jected the argument that equated the seizure of expressive materials
with the seizure of other contraband such as gambling parapherna-
lia.93 The Court distinguished expressive materials from other
contraband in that warrants for the seizure of obscene materials
"implicates questions whether the procedures leading to their issu-
ance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid sup-
pression of constitutionally protected publications." 94 Finally, the
Court held such a statute violates not only the distributor's First
Amendment rights, but the public's First Amendment rights as
well. The Court concluded that "if seizure of books precedes an
adversary determination of their obscenity, there is danger of
86. Id. at 206-08.
87. Id. at 208-09. Although not required by the statute, the prosecutor, in response
to Marcus, filed an Information, identifying 59 novels by title. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 209. Of the 59 titles listed in the warrant, the sheriff discovered only 31
of the novels on the premises. Id. In all, 1,715 copies were seized. Id.
90. Id. at 209.
91. Id. at 210-11.
92. Id. at 210.
93. Id. at 211-12.
94. Id. (quoting Marcus 367 U.S. at 731).
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abridgment of the right of the public in a free society to unob-
structed circulation of nonobscene books., 95
Subsequently, the Court distinguished massive seizures as in
Marcus and A Quantity of Books from the seizure of individual
copies for evidentiary purposes. In Heller v. United States,9 6 the
Court held that seizing a copy of film to preserve it as evidence
was constitutionally permissible where there had been no showing
that the seizure precluded continued exhibition of the film. 97 Police
seized a copy of a film entitled Blue Movie after a judge and police
inspector went to the theater and watched a performance upon the
request of a prosecutor.98 At the end of the film the judge signed
arrest warrants for the theater manager, projectionist, and ticket
taker.99 In executing the warrant, a single copy of the film was
seized."° The Court held that seizing a single copy of a film for
evidentiary purposes was different than seizing all copies of a film
in order to block distribution. 101  The Court stated that, provided
proper safeguards were in place, the seizure of a film for evidentia-
ry purposes may have been a temporary restraint; however, it did
not "become a form of censorship."' 2 The Court held that a great-
er level of scrutiny would be reserved for "large-scale seizure of
. . . materials presumptively protected under the First Amend-
95. Id. at 213.
96. 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
97. Id. at 490.
98. Id. at 485.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 486.
101. Id. at 492. The Court held:
[Sleizing films to destroy them or to block their distribution or exhibition is a
very different matter from seizing a single copy of a film for the bona fide
purpose of preserving it as evidence in a criminal proceeding, particularly
where, as here, there is no showing or pretrial claim that the seizure of the copy
prevented continuing exhibition of the film.
Id.
102. Id. at 490. The Court delineated three requirements in order that a seizure for
evidentiary purposes be constitutional. First, the seizure must be "pursuant to a warrant."
Second, the warrant must issue upon a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate.
Third, "a prompt judicial determination of the obscenity issue in an adversary proceeding
is available at the request of any interested party." Id. at 492.
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ment"'10 3 to ensure that the public's right to the "unobstructed circu-
lation" of books was not abridged.'04 The Court further stated that
"[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. 1 °5
The Supreme Court has also addressed proper procedural safe-
guards in the context of a RICO prosecution. In Fort Wayne
Books, Inc. v. Indiana,106 the Court affirmed the proposition put
forth in Heller and its predecessors that a "publication may not be
taken out of circulation completely until there has been a determi-
nation of obscenity after an adversary hearing."' 7 However, the
Court framed the issue in terms of an unconstitutional prior re-
straint, rather than the public's right of access.10 8 In Fort Wayne
Books, prosecutors used predicate obscenity offenses to charge two
adult-book store operators with violating the state's RICO laws.'0 9
Upon a finding of probable cause that the defendants had violated
-state obscenity laws, the judge directed the immediate seizure of
the publications, real estate, and other personal property of the
corporate defendants."l 0 The Supreme Court noted that since the
proceedings were aimed at halting the sale of obscenity at the de-
fendants' bookstores, "the special rules applicable to removing First
Amendment materials from circulation are relevant here.""' The
Court held that "mere probable cause to believe a legal violation
has transpired is not adequate to remove books or films from circu-
lation.""' 2  Moreover, the fact that the motion for seizure was
brought under RICO as opposed to the substantive obscenity statute
was unavailing." 3 Whether the seizure is characterized as a forfei-
103. Id. at 491 (quoting A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 213).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 491-92 (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714
(1971)).
106. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
107. Id. at 63 (citing Heller, 413 U.S. at 492-93; New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475
U.S. 868, 874-76 (1986)).
108. See id. at 63-64.
109. Id. at 50-51.
110. Id. at 52.
111. Id. at 65.
112. Id. at 66.
113. Id. The Court stated that "the way in which a restraint on speech is 'character-
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ture of assets under RICO or an injunction under the applicable
state obscenity laws, the Court stated that "the risk of prior re-
straint, which is the underlying basis for the special Fourth Amend-
ment protections accorded searches for and seizure of First Amend-
ment materials" is ever present." 14
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the state
RICO statute was unconstitutional not only in the context of pre-
trial forfeitures, but post-trial forfeitures as well." 5  He noted that
the RICO statute permits prosecutors "to cast wide nets," ' 1 6 as all
of a store's books and films are subject to forfeiture upon a show-
ing of two obscenity violations." 7 Moreover, Justice Stevens main-
tained that the specific purpose of the statute was to enhance the
government's capabilities in obscenity prosecutions at the expense
of traditional constitutional protections.' 18  Thus, Justice Stevens
stated that he would extend the majority's holding to prohibit the
forfeiture of a store's inventory, even after trial, when predicated.
on minor obscenity violations. "9 Justice Stevens concluded: "'[I]t
ized' under state law is of little consequence." id.
114. Id. at 63-64 (citing Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985)).
115. Id. at 71 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
116. Id. at 81.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 83. Justice Stevens stated that the purpose of RICO was to "expand
beyond traditional prosecution of legally obscene materials into restriction of materials
that, though constitutionally protected, have the same undesired effect on the community's
morals as those that are actually obscene." Id.
119. Id. at 84. Distinguishing between expressive and nonexpressive activities,
Justice Stevens stated that the First Amendment was implicated only when RICO targeted
the former:
[T]here is a difference of constitutional dimension between an enterprise that
is engaged in the business of selling and exhibiting books, magazines, and
videotapes and one that is engaged in another commercial activity, lawful or
unlawful. A bookstore receiving revenue from sales of obscene books is not the
same as a hardware store or pizza parlor funded by loan-sharking proceeds.
The presumptive First Amendment protection accorded the former does not
apply either to the predicate offense or to the business use in the latter. Seldom
will First Amendment protections have any relevance to the sanctions that might
be invoked against an ordinary commercial establishment. Nor will use of
RICO/CRRA sanctions to rid that type of enterprise of illegal influence, even
by closing it, engender suspicion of censorial motive. Prosecutors in such cases
desire only to purge the organized-crime taint; they have no interest in deterring
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is better to leave a few ...noxious branches to their luxuriant
growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure the vigour of those
yielding the proper fruits,' for the 'right to receive information and
ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamental to our free
society."12
0
Il. THE PRIOR RESTRAINT DOCTRINE
In Marcus and A Quantity of Books, the Supreme Court re-
quired a prompt adversary hearing before the state executed mas-
sive seizures of materials presumptively protected by the First
Amendment.121 The Court stated that this safeguard was necessary
in order to ensure the public's right to "unobstructed circulation"
of books, films and other materials that are not obscene. 2 2 While
expressing similar concerns, later cases, such as Heller and Fort
Wayne Books, addressed the issue in terms of the Court's hostility
towards prior restraints123 The Court's increased focus in regard-
ing the seizure of nonobscene materials as a prior restraint issue
culminated in Alexander v. United States. 24 In Alexander, the
Court's narrow interpretation of the prior restraint doctrine failed
to take into account the underlying rationale of the doctrine, name-
ly the protection of both the speaker's and the audience's right to
the free exchange of protected materials. 25
As the previous discussion suggests, the prior restraint doctrine
plays a significant role in First Amendment law. While the doc-
trine of prior restraint has a long history, a brief account of its
origins and a discussion of the issues the doctrine raises are offered
the sale of pizzas or hardware. Sexually explicit books and movies, however,
are commodities the State does want to exterminate. The RICO/CRRA scheme
promotes such extermination through elimination of the very establishments
where sexually explicit speech is disseminated.
id. at 84-85.
120. Id. at 85-86 (citations omitted).
121. See supra notes 69-95 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 213.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 105, 114.
124. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
125. See infra part IV.B.
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in order to better understand the Supreme Court's decision in Alex-
ander.
A. A Brief History
The history of the prior restraint doctrine dates back to early
English common law. 2 6 The English Licensing Act of 1662 re-
quired official licensing for all printed publications. 27 However,
the Licensing Act was allowed to expire in 1695, due more to its
unwieldy administration than from public outcry.128 A century later
freedom from licensing of the press had become recognized as one
of the basic rights of Englishmen. 29 Thus, Blackstone stated, in
his often quoted passage, that freedom of the press meant freedom
from prior restraints:
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of
a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints
upon publications, and not in freedom from censure for
criminal matter when published. Every freeman has as
undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before
the public; to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the
press, but if he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or
illegal, he must take the consequence of his own temerity. 30
At the time of the First Amendment's adoption, licensing
schemes had not been known for a hundred years in England and
had never been known in the American states.' 3' James Madison,
in introducing the First Amendment, stated unequivocally, "[t]he
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to
126. The history of the prior restraint doctrine has been exhaustively chronicled
elsewhere. For an early history see Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 245-
50 (1936); Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648, 650-55 (1955). For a more modern account see John C. Jeffries, Jr., Rethink-
ing Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 412-19 (1983); Jeffrey A. Smith, Prior Restraint:.
Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 447-70
(1986).
127. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 412.
128. Emerson, supra note 126, at 651.
129. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 412.
130. Id. at 413 (quoting 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 152).
131. See Emerson, supra note 126, at 650-52.
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write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press,
as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable." 132
Similarly, a majority of the revolutionary-era state constitutions
guaranteed freedom of the press in absolutist terms.1 33 Maryland's
Declaration of Rights, for example, declared "[tihat the liberty of
the press ought to be inviolably preserved." 134
Nevertheless, in one of its earliest First Amendment opinions,
the Supreme Court held that "freedom of the press" meant freedom
only from licensing schemes and pre-publication government cen-
sorship. Justice Holmes, writing for the Court in Patterson v. Col-
orado,135 echoed the sentiments of Blackstone. 13 6 He held that the
main purpose of the First Amendment was "'to prevent all such
previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by
other governments,' . . . [it] does not prevent the subsequent pun-
ishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public wel-
fare.' 137
Even as subsequent decisions expanded the doctrine of prior
restraint beyond licensing and government censors, First Amend-
ment jurisprudence held on to the distinction between prior restraint
and subsequent punishment first proposed by Blackstone and later
adopted by Holmes. In the landmark case Near v. Minnesota,138
Chief Justice Hughes, writing for the Court, noted the criticisms of
Blackstone's distinction between prior restraint and subsequent
punishment. 39 Namely, the Court recognized that subsequent pun-
ishment could potentially suppress First Amendment freedoms as
effectively as prior restraints. 14° Nevertheless, the Court acknowl-
132. Smith, supra note 126, at 457 (quoting JAMES MADISON, Amendments to the
Constitution, 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 370, 377 (G. Hunt ed. 1900-1910)).
133. Id. at 454.
134. Id. (quoting 1 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
235, 284 (1971)).
135. 205 U.S. 454 (1907).
136. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
137. Patterson, 205 U.S. at 462 (citations omitted).
138. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
139. Id. at 714-15.
140. Id. The Court stated:
The criticism upon Blackstone's statement has not been because immunity from
previous restraint upon publication has not been regarded as deserving of spe-
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edged that "freedom of the press" has meant "principally although
not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or censor-
ship."'14 1 While the Court recognized that the subsequent punish-
ment of publications could be deserving of some constitutional
scrutiny, the Court thought it necessary to preserve the subsequent
punishment-prior restraint distinction in order to strike a balance
between freedom of the press and checks against its abuses.142
Thus, while reaffirming traditional notions of the prior restraint
doctrine, the Near decision had two additional consequences. First,
the Court expanded the doctrine by recognizing injunctions as a
prior restraint. 143 Second, the Court recognized some constitutional
protections against subsequent punishment.144
As Professor John Jeffries notes, subsequent cases have done
little to elucidate the prior restraint doctrine.145 Professor Jeffries
divides these cases into three groups. In one line of cases the
Court "invoked the historic hostility to press licensing to invalidate
modem permit requirements."'' 46 For example, in Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 147 the Court struck down a statute prohibiting the
cial emphasis .... The point of the criticism has been "that the mere exemp-
tion from previous restraints cannot be all that is secured by the constitutional
provisions"; and that "the liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and
a delusion, and the phrase itself a by-word, if, while every man was at liberty
to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might nevertheless punish him
for harmless publications."
Id. (citation omitted).
141. Id. at 716.
142. See id. Concerned with protecting the public from the libelous attacks of
scandal sheets, the Court emphasized that in certain instances subsequent punishment of
publications was necessary. The Court stated:
The fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant purveyors of
scandal does not make any the less necessary the immunity of the press from
previous restraint in dealing with official misconduct. Subsequent punishment
for such abuses as may exist is the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitu-
tional privilege.
id. at 720 (emphasis added).
143. See id. at 722-23.
144. See id. at 720.
145. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 417.
146. Id.
147. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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unlicensed commercial screening of motion pictures and authoriz-
ing denial of licenses for films deemed sacrilegious.148  Similarly,
in Lovell v. City of Griffin,149 the Court struck down a municipal
ordinance forbidding distribution of "literature of any kind" without
prior approval from the city manager.15° In this line of cases, prior
restraints were imposed by conditioning speech on the previous
approval of a government official. 5' "[T]he legality of speech [did
not] depend ... on the substantive standard of exclusion from the
First Amendment (for example, incitement or obscenity), but on the
presence or absence of prior permission."' 52
A second line of cases extended the rule against prior restraints
to a diverse assortment of injunctions against speech and publica-
tion. 53 Citing New York Times Co. v. United States154 as the "pre-
mier example," Jeffries observes that in each of these cases the
prior restraint bar was triggered by the issuance of an injunction.1 55
In New York Times, the government sought to enjoin publication of
classified documents known as the Pentagon Papers. 56  The per
curiam opinion of the Court held that the injunction was an imper-
missible prior restraint 57 The Court declared that "[a]ny system
of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against Constitutional validity. ' '
148. See id. at 506.
149. 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
150. Id. at 451-52.
151. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 417.
152. Id. at 417-18. As Jeffries notes, enforcement of these permit schemes was
accomplished through criminal prosecution and punishment. Id. at 417.
153. Id. at 418.
154. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
155. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 418.
156. See New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714. The Pentagon Papers were a classified
study entitled "History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam policy." Id.
157. See id.
158. Id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963)). Jeffries
notes, however, that:
In none of [these cases] . . . was it clear that the speech in question could
validly have been suppressed by subsequent punishment. It is difficult to tell,
therefore, whether the doctrine of prior restraint was merely a convenient rheto-
ric, or whether it was actually applied to protect against injunction speech that
would not have been protected against prosecution and punishment.
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A third line of cases struck down statutes which involved nei-
ther permit requirements nor injunctions.'59 For example, in
Grosjean v. American Press Co.,16° the Court struck down a-gross
receipts tax on newspapers as a prior restraint.16 1 In Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan,162 the Court held the activities of the Rhode Island
Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth to be an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint.163 The Commission was authorized to identify
certain books and magazines as unsuitable for sale to minors. 64
However, the Commission had no power to suppress publications;
it could only recommend criminal prosecution. 65  Finally, the
Court held in Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad16 6 that a
city's refusal to rent a municipal theater for a production of Hair
amounted to an unconstitutional prior restraint. 167
B. The Debate Surrounding the Prior Restraint Doctrine
Commentary regarding the prior restraint doctrine has been
pervasive and robust. 168  Commentators can be generally divided
into two camps as to the prior restraint doctrine's proper role in
First Amendment jurisprudence: the traditional view and the mod-
em view. The traditional view holds that the doctrine is a useful,
Jeffries, supra note 126, at 418.
159. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 418-19.
160. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
161. See id. at 250-51.
162. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
163. See id. at 70-72.
164. Id. at 59-60.
165. Id. at 66-67.
166. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
167. See id. at 552.
168. See Jeffries, supra note 126; Emerson, supra note 126; William T. Mayton,
Toward a Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech, Subsequent Punish-
ment, and the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 245 (1982);
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect",
58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 725-31 (1978) [hereinafter Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First
Amendment]; see also Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine
in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53 (1984); Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory
of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 MINN. L. REV. 11 (1981); Stephen R.
Barnett, The Puzzle of Prior Restraint, 29 STAN. L. REV. 539 (1977); William P. Murphy,
The Prior Restraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 898 (1976).
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if not essential, tool in protecting First Amendment rights. 169 This
view has been adopted by the vast majority of American courts.170
The modem view, on the other hand, contends that the doctrine is
at best worthless and, at worst, a misleading categorization that dis-
tracts from the true substantive First Amendment issues in a
case. 171
1. The Traditional View
The traditional view defines prior restraints as "official restric-
tions imposed upon speech or other forms of expression in advance
of actual publication."' 172 Thus, a subsequent punishment is distin-
guished as "a penalty imposed after the communication has been
made as a punishment for having made it.''173  Hence, the prior
restraint doctrine "imposes a special bar on attempts to suppress
speech prior to publication, a bar that is distinct from the scope of
constitutional protection accorded material after publication."174
While acknowledging that the doctrine of prior restraint remains
"curiously confused and unformed,"'17  Professor Thomas Emerson
cites several of the doctrine's most salient features. 176  First, the
169. Emerson, supra note 126, at 670.
170. See supra notes 135-67 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 126; Mayton, supra note 168; Schauer, Fear, Risk
and the First Amendment, supra note 168. A third view falls somewhere in the middle,
arguing that the doctrine is an important protection in certain instances; however, this
view also calls for certain fundamental modifications of the doctrine. See Blasi, supra
note 168; Redish, supra note 168.
172. Emerson, supra note 126, at 648. Professor Emerson is considered by many
as a leading authority on the prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 126,
at 411 n.13. While the Supreme Court has favored the traditional view of the prior
restraint doctrine, it has rarely explained its justification for this position. See MELVILLE
B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.04,- at 4-18 to 4-19 (1984). Thus, this
Comment relies heavily on Emerson's thorough analysis for its clear articulation of the
traditional view.
173. Emerson, supra note 126, at 648.
174. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-34, at 1040 (2d
ed. 1988).
175. Emerson, supra note 126, at 649.
176. While concentrating on the effects of executive prior restraints, Emerson delin-
eates four broad categories of prior restraint. Emerson, supra note 126, at 655-56. The
first category includes those restraints that seek to prevent future communication or
publication in the absence of "advance approval of an executive official." id. at 655.
Such restraints include licensing laws, motion picture censorship and permit requirements
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doctrine purports to deal with matters of form rather than sub-
stance.1 77 The doctrine does not address governmental restrictions
of substance in an area of expression, such as prohibiting obscenity
in newspapers.1 78  Rather, the doctrine addresses the particular
method of government censure, such as requiring pre-approval of
newspaper copy. 179 Second, the doctrine is purportedly predisposed
to more precise application than other First Amendment analytical
frameworks. 18
0
The traditional view offers a number of justifications for the
doctrine's hostility towards prior restraints. In one of its few pro-
nouncements regarding the underlying justification for the doctrine,
the Supreme Court stated:
Behind the distinction is a theory deeply etched in our law:
a free society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of
speech after they break the law than to throttle them and all
others beforehand. It is always difficult to know in advance
what an individual will say, and the line between legitimate
and illegitimate speech is often so finely drawn that the
for meetings in public areas. Id. The second category involves judicial officials who
prevent future speech through injunctions or similar means. Id. The injunction is en-
forced by subsequent contempt proceedings if the communication violates the judicial
order. Id. at 655-56. A third category involves legislative restraints that condition com-
munication upon previous compliance with specific requirements promulgated by a statute
or ordinance. Id. at 656. Examples of such restraints include requiring registration of
lobbyists and imposing taxes on newspapers. Id. The final category includes restrictions
that contain elements of prior restraint, but the restraint appears "secondary to some other
immediate objective." Id. As an example, Emerson offers instances where political views
are used as a test for holding political office. Id.
177. Emerson, supra note 126, at 648.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Emerson asserts that the doctrine:
does not require the same degree of judicial balancing that the courts have held
to be necessary in the use of the clear and present danger test, the rule against
vagueness, the doctrine that a statute must be narrowly drawn, or the various
formulae of reasonableness. Hence, it does not involve the same necessity for
the court to pit its judgment on controversial matters of economics, politics, or
social theory against that of the legislature.
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risks of freewheeling censorship are formidable."' 1
Thus, the traditional view maintains that a significant distinction
between prior restraints and subsequent punishments is that the for-
mer proscribes speech without knowing in advance what a person
subject to the prior restraint will say.1 12  A broader spectrum of
communication, therefore, is subject to a system of prior restraint,
as both protected and unprotected speech fall within the ambit of
the prior restraint. 8 3
The traditional view holds that the administration of prior re-
straints also makes them disfavored. Subsequent punishment of a
communication requires more time, money, and personnel. 84 Addi-
tionally, in a system of subsequent punishment, the communication
is made before the government proscription is effective. Hence, a
government official may be more reluctant to institute a prosecu-
tion involving subsequent punishment, as the communication
sought to be suppressed has already been made. 185 In contrast, a
scheme of prior restraints allows the official to suppress the com-
munication "by a simple stroke of the pen.'.'i8 6 Furthermore, the
institutional framework of the censor encourages an overzealous
administration of his duties.8 7 As Emerson notes, "[t]he function
181. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
182. See NIMMER, supra note 172, § 4.04, at 4-19.
183. Emerson, supra note 126, at 656.
184. Id. at 657.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 659. Emerson points to the particular dynamics of prior restraints as per-
haps their most significant feature. Id. at 658. Emerson argues that prior restraints
"contain within themselves forces which drive irresistibly toward unintelligent, overzeal-
ous, and usually absurd administration." Id. Citing particularly the area of obscenity,
Emerson asserts government officials' "attitudes, drives, emotions, and impulses" lead
them to suppress free communication. Id. As support for this proposition, Emerson
quotes from Milton's Areopagitica:
If [the censor] be of such worth as behoves him, there cannot be a more tedious
and unpleasing journey-work, a greater loss of time levied upon his head, than
to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books and pamphlets ... we may
easily foresee what kind of licensers we are to expect hereafter, either ignorant,
imperious, and remiss or basely pecuniary.
Emerson, supra note 126, at 658 (omission in. original) (quoting JOHN MILTON,
AREOPAGITICA 20-21 (Everyman ed., 1927)).
1995]
396 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
of the censor is to censor. He has a professional interest in finding
things to suppress."''
88
Finally, the traditional view claims that a system of prior re-
straints lacks the procedural safeguards inherent in a scheme of
subsequent punishment. Acknowledging that both systems rely
ultimately on penal sanctions, Emerson nevertheless notes a number
of differences.'8 9 The penal proceeding for a prior restraint usually
involves only the limited issue of whether the communication was
made absent prior approval.' 9° On the other hand, a penal proceed-
ing involving a system of subsequent punishment would require a
finding that the communication was made by the defendant, that
the communication was within the ambit of the statute proscribing
the speech, and that the proscription of such speech was constitu-
tional.' 9' Moreover, a system of subsequent punishment affords the
transgressor due process rights that are generally not available in
a system of prior restraints. In a system of subsequent punishment
the defendant is afforded the presumption of innocence, the govern-
ment must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and evidence
offered by the government is subject to stricter rules of admissibili-
ty. 92
188. Id. at 659. Emerson cites another difference between the two regimes: "the
violation of a censorship order strikes sharply at the status of the licensor, whose prestige
thus becomes involved and whose power must be vindicated." Id. at 659-60.
189. id. at 659.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 657. Moreover, as Professor Howard Hunter notes:
[T]he local prosecutor normally must secure the help of the police, make a
grand jury presentment, prepare for and prosecute a jury trial, prove his case
beyond a reasonable doubt, and contend with the complexities of the criminal
process from arrest through arraignment, indictment, and trial. The entire pro-
cess usually takes several months. In contrast, to seek an injunction the prose-
cutor need only file a complaint, perhaps post a bond, and prepare for a non-
jury hearing in which he will bear only a civil burden of proof. If he seeks a
temporary restraining order, the hearing will occur within a matter of days or
even hours. A hearing on a preliminary injunction is also held quite soon after
the filing of a complaint. The trial on the merits may not take place any sooner
than a criminal trial, but if the prosecutor is successful in obtaining a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, the issue may well become moot.
Howard 0. Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint Doctrine: A
Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 283, 285 (1982).
192. Emerson, supra note 126, at 657. In a system of prior restraints:
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In sum, the traditional view contends that the intrinsic deficien-
cies of prior restraints have a significant impact on protected
speech. First, a subsequent punishment takes effect once the com-
munication has been made. Thus, the communication reaches the
marketplace of ideas. 193 Prior restraints, however, take effect be-
fore the communication is made. Hence, the prior restraint at-
tempts to bar the communication from ever reaching public. 94
While both schemes are ultimately enforced by subsequent punish-
ment, Professor Howard Hunter notes, "there is a world of differ-
ence between a government statement that one cannot speak at all
refusal to comply with the order normally will be treated as an instance of civil
contempt and the defendant will not be entitled to criminal due process, not-
withstanding the possibility of a jail sentence or a fine .... The net effect is
that the contempt sanction may make an injunction or other equitable order a
more powerful remedy than many criminal statutes, particularly those prescrib-
ing a relatively mild misdemeanor sentence.
Hunter, supra note 191, at 287.
In terms of a prior restraint's application, the traditional view discounts the notion
that prior restraints afford citizens greater certainty and less risks than subsequent punish-
ment. Emerson, supra note 126, at 659. Emerson acknowledges that licensing systems
may be favored over subsequent punishment in some quarters such as the motion picture
industry and publishers of popular fare, as an individual can find out what expression is
legal or illegal without incurring criminal sanction. Id. However, according to Emerson,
this argument does not consider society's interest in free expression. Those bold individu-
als willing to take the risk of subsequent punishment are barred by a system of prior
restraints. Id. Emerson asserts that the contention that prior restraints entail less risk and
greater certainty "implies a philosophy of willingness to conform to official opinion and
a sluggishness or timidity in asserting rights that bodes ill for a spirited and healthy
expression of unorthodox and unaccepted opinion." Id.
193. Emerson, supra note 126, at 657. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), in which Holmes stated:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accept-
ed in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.
Id.; Emerson, supra note 126, at 657 ("Under a system of subsequent punishment, the
communication has already been made before the government takes action; it thus takes
its place, for whatever it may be worth, in the marketplace of ideas. Under a system of
prior restraint, the communication, if banned, never reaches the marketplace at all.").
194. Emerson, supra note 126, at 657.
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and a statement that one can speak out at some risk of paying a
specified cost.' ' 195 Second, a broader spectrum of speech is threat-
ened, as all expression within the parameters of the restraint are
subject to suppression-"the innocent and borderline as well as the
offensive, the routine as well as the unusual."'196 Third, the fact
that they are easier to effectuate encourages more frequent applica-
tion. 197 The traditional view, therefore, determines that prior re-
straints "operate as a greater deterrent to free expression and cause
graver damage to fundamental democratic rights than a system of
subsequent punishment."' 98
2. The Modem View
More recent commentary has taken issue with some of the tra-
ditional view's basic tenets. These commentators seek a modifica-
tion of the prior restraint doctrine or to do away with it entirely.
They contend that a reevaluation of the doctrine is necessary, since
a number of flaws inherent in the doctrine undermine a coherent
First Amendment analysis. First, the modem view asserts that
"prior restraint" is an uncertain term that has been erratically ap-
plied.' 99 Second, critics of the doctrine argue that it renders an
analysis of form in place of a substantive analysis. 2 ° Consequent-
ly, the doctrine fails to address government proscriptions that take
the form of subsequent punishment, but nevertheless suppress pro-
195. Hunter, supra note 191, at 293.
196. Emerson, supra note 126, at 656.
197. Id. at 657.
198. Id. at 660.
199. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 419. Professor Jeffries states his objection to the
prior restraint doctrine's application as follows:
At least as applied by the Courts, the doctrine is fundamentally unintelligible.
It purports to assess the constitutionality of government action by distinguishing
prior restraint from subsequent punishment, but provides no coherent basis for
making that categorization .... Some prior restraints involve permit require-
ments; others do not. Some involve injunctions; others do not. Some cases
involving neither permits nor injunctions are treated as prior restraints; others
are not. The doctrine purports to deal with matters of form rather than of
substance, but there is no unity among the forms of government action con-
demned as prior restraints.
200. Id.
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tected expression as effectively as prior restraints. 20 1
The modem view contends that a system of subsequent punish-
ment is marked by an "inherent residual vagueness." 20 2 Several
factors are cited for the vagueness that inheres in a system of sub-
sequent punishment. Laws implementing a regime of subsequent
punishment are unable to identify with any degree of specificity the
speech to be suppressed.20 3 Additionally, the law's vagueness is
compounded by the fact that "the illegality consists of the speaker's
201. While many proponents of the modern view agree that administrative (execu-
tive) prior restraints are especially objectionable, they point to discretion as the key factor.
Id. at 424. Hence, the fault lies not with the timing of the governmental proscription, but
with the discretion afforded the public official in determining which speech falls under
the ban. Jeffries notes that where the standards guiding the licensing authority are vague
and allow for broad discretion, the Court will strike down the system. Id. at 423-24
(citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965)). On the other hand, where standards
guiding the licensing authority are "narrow, objective and definite" the Court will routine-
ly uphold the system, such as in cases involving parade permit laws. id. at 423 (citing
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 151 (1969)). Thus, a valid
preclearance statute must either "eliminat[e] executive discretion by specific standards or
control[] it by judicial supervision." Id. at 424. The prior restraint doctrine, on the other
hand, does not distinguish overly broad discretion as the dispositive factor. Instead, it
purports to address only the chronology of the government's action vis-a-vis the subject
communication. The doctrine says administrative preclearances are especially disfavored.
Id. However, as Jeffries notes:
[The prior restraint doctrine] does not say which preclearance schemes should
be upheld and which should be struck down. It does not identify discretion as
the crucial factor .... The point here is not that the doctrine of prior restraint
works any particular mischief (at least not within this context), but only that it
is not very helpful.
Id. at 424-25.
Jeffries contends that the Court, in effect, is engaging in an overbreadth analysis in
these instances. Id. at 425. The overbreadth doctrine holds that where an activity could
be suppressed by a more narrowly drawn statute, an overbroad statute will be struck down
if it allows for application of the statute substantially beyond the permissible scope by
regulating protected activity. See id. Jeffries argues that if the Court were to articulate
its application of the overbreadth doctrine in these cases, the Court would then be forced
to focus on the critical issue, namely the government official's discretion. Id. at 425-26.
Hence, the overbreadth doctrine would provide the Court with a clearer test and a more
consistent approach in cases involving administrative preclearances. Id. at 424-25.
202. Mayton, supra note 168, at 254 (borrowing the phrase from Justice Brennan's
criticism of obscenity laws in Paris Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 84 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting) (quoting Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 475 n.19 (1966))).
203. Mayton, supra note 168, at 254.
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instilling a certain state of mind in the listener .... Thus, the
speaker is not sufficiently apprised in advance as to what consti-
tutes illegal speech. °5 This uncertainty is further heightened by ill-
defined standards that allow for "erroneous declaration or appli-
cation of the law." 2°
In addition, the modem view maintains that a system of subse-
quent punishment poses risks of overbroad application. 27  Legal
standards are intrinsically overinclusive, as they lend themselves to
generalized application.20 1 Hence, in comparing. subsequent pun-
ishment to an injunctive scheme, Jeffries notes that the latter is
"particularized, immediate, and concrete" ;209 whereas the former is
"a more generalized and impersonal threat . ,,210 The more
generalized application of a criminal statute allows government
authorities to direct the statute's application to a wider spectrum of
disfavored speech activity.2 1
The modem commentators assert that there are significant con-
sequences resulting from the vagueness and overbreadth intrinsic
in a system of subsequent punishment. First, by threatening or
actually engaging in discriminatory prosecutions, the government
may effectuate "broad and unbridled" suppression of speech.21 2
Even though speech subject to penal sanctions will receive judicial
scrutiny, provided an action is brought, litigating the matter may
prove to be prohibitive, particularly in the face of repeat prosecu-
204. Id. at 255.
205.. Id. at 256.
206. Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168, at 699 n.65.
207. See Mayton, supra note 168, at 259.
208. See, e.g., id. at 259-60.,
209. Jeffries, supra note 126, at 429.
210. Id.
211. See Mayton, supra note 168, at 260. Mayton points to the "criminal anarchy"
statutes enacted after the assassination of President McKinley in 1902. Id. (citing Linde,
"Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1163, 1176-78 (1970)). Subsequently, the statutes were used to suppress
the political activities of socialists and communists following World Wars I and II. Id.
"'[W]hatever danger the new radicalism posed ... , it was not [of the same danger as] the
demonstrative assassinations' by the nineteenth century anarchists that occasioned the
statutes." Id. (quoting Linde, supra, at 1176) (alterations in original).
212. Id. at 256.
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213 Tuttions. Thus, these critics claim that "a system of subsequent
punishment, by the police censorship it inculcates, permits the state
to exploit the overinclusiveness of these laws and suppress speech
that disturbs the current governing faction. 21 4
Besides the threat of unchecked prosecutorial discretion, the
modem view contends that a system of subsequent punishment
permits a second, perhaps even more pernicious, form of suppres-
sion. Namely, the vagueness and uncertainty inherent in penal
sanctions engenders self-imposed censorship,2 5 Indeed, these crit-
ics note that the very purpose of penal sanctions- in this context is
not only to punish those who violate the law, but also to induce
self-censorship on the part of those who are unwilling to risk the
threat of prosecution and punishment.21 Such a deterrent effect
does not, by itself violate constitutional principles. However, con-
stitutional principles are implicated when a penal sanction directed
at unprotected speech deters individuals from engaging in protected
speech.217 This "chilling effect ' 218 is a product of the fear generat-
ed by the uncertainty surrounding a penal law's. application to a
213. Id. at 257. Mayton notes that "[c]urrently, the police discretion afforded by
vague obscenity laws is being used in various locales to censor speech that is unaccept-
able to majoritarian sentiments, or to the tastes of local law enforcement officials." Id.
He recounts the following:
In Atlanta, a district attorney's thorough and relentless prosecutions has forced
the distributors of magazines, books, and movies that his office considers ob-
scene to cease distribution of such materials. This success was engendered not
by the fact that a judge and jury determined that these materials were obscene,
but because the distributors simply could not bear the cost of subsequent pun-
ishment as assessed by the district attorney. In particular, the distributors final-
ly chose not to bear the continuous litigation costs necessary to defend their
practices.
Id. (citing ATLANTA CONSTrrIUTION, Jan. 18, 1981, § B, at 1; id. Jan. 17, 1981, § B, at
1).
214. Mayton, supra note 168, at 262.
215. Id. at 261.
216. Id.
217. Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168, at 693.
218. Specifically, Schauer offers the following definition: "A chilling effect occurs
when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the first amendment are
deterred from so doing by governmental regulation not specifically directed at that pro-
tected activity." Id. at 693 (emphasis omitted).
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particular speech activity2 9 and the severity of the punishment
accompanying those sanctions. 220 The danger is that as the severity
of the punishment increases along with the uncertainty of a given
statute's application, "[t]he risk-averse among us, those who will
not chance the costs of prosecution and punishment, simply will
not speak."
221
The modem commentators argue that these characteristics of
subsequent punishment call into question many of the prior re-
straint doctrine's basic tenets. First, the "inherent overinclusiveness
of laws against speech" 222 allows for the same discriminatory en-
forcement in a system of subsequent punishment that the prior
restraint doctrine attempts to deter.223 Second, in comparing the
effects of injunctions and subsequent punishment on protected
speech, an injunction may be more effective at proscribing the
expressive activity at which it is aimed, but it is narrowly con-
fined.224 Thus, there is less risk of deterring activity beyond the
219. Schauer discusses a number of factors as the source of this uncertainty, includ-
ing the possibility of error in application of the relevant legal standards, as well as the
inability of the speaker to determine whether his speech violates those legal standards.
Id. at 694-99.
220. See id. at 697-99. An additional consideration is the expected benefit derived
from the speech activity. Id. at 698. Schauer offers the following formula: "Deterrence
= risk aversion ((probability of punishment x extent of punishment) - expected benefit)."
Id. at 698 n.62. As an example Schauer cites the case of a law which imposes sanctions
on a bookseller for possession of obscene materials:
The difficulty is not that the merchant is theoretically unable to discover the
nature of all the publications in his store, but rather, that as a practical matter,
it is nearly impossible for him to do so. The burden imposed by such a statute,
particularly on a seller with an enormous inventory, is simply too great. Thus,
if punishment may be inflicted without proof of scienter, a bookseller will be
thrust into a state of uncertainty. This uncertainty will create a fear, a fear
ultimately resulting in the chilling of protected activity.
Id. at 699.
221. See Mayton, supra note 168, at 268; Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amend-
ment, supra note 168, at 698.
222. See Mayton, supra note 168, at 267. Hence, "the state gains an unconfined
discretion to pick and choose the idea that it would smother with the costs of subsequent
punishment." Id.
223. Cf. Emerson, supra note 126, at 656.
224. Mayton, supra note 168, at 270.
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specific target of the injunction.22 5 The uncertain prospect of crimi-
nal prosecution in a scheme of subsequent punishment, however,
may prove sufficient incentive "to steer well clear of arguably
proscribed activities., 226 Moreover, such self-censorship eludes the
judicial scrutiny required in each instance of suppression.227 The
modem view asserts that "[a] system of injunctive relief, on the
other hand, is more protective of first amendment values because
it requires such process., 228 Hence, the rationale that a system of
subsequent punishment offers greater procedural safeguards is
called into question, as it does not take into consideration those
instances of self-censorship such systems induce. 229 The deterrent
effect of subsequent punishment also underscores the relative costs
of each scheme of enforcement. Enforcement costs are minimized
in a system of subsequent punishment, since suppression is
achieved through deterrence.23 ° Conversely, injunctive relief im-
poses significantly greater enforcement costs, as in each instance
the state seeks suppression judicial process is required. 2
Finally, the modem commentators contend that the deterrence
induced by a system of subsequent punishment calls into question
an even more basic precept of the prior restraint doctrine. The
prior restraint doctrine holds that the most significant difference
between a scheme of prior restraints and subsequent punishment is
that the former takes effect prior to the speech having been made,
while the latter takes effect once the speech has been made.232
Therefore, subsequent punishment allows the speech to reach the
marketplace of ideas, whereas a prior restraint stops it from occur-
ring at all.233 Such an analysis, however, fails to consider two
relevant factors. First, both schemes are enforced only after the
225. Id.
226. Id. at 256 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
227. Id. at 261.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 268.
230. Id. at 269.
231. Id. at 272.
232. See Emerson, supra note 126, at 657.
233. Id.
1995]
404 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
speech has occurred.234 Second, auid more importantly, such an
analysis does not consider that subsequent punishment's deterrent
effect suppresses speech on "a broad scale, through the extensive
self-censorship that it inculcates. 235 As Mayton notes, "[t]his too
is lost speech, in an amount likely to be greater than that of speech
lost by the more specific suppression of an injunction. 236
Thus, many modern commentators urge modification of the
prior restraint doctrine or its outright retirement. 237 These commen-
tators assert that the traditional distinction between prior restraints
and subsequent punishment shrouds the fact that a system of subse-
quent punishment may exact far greater costs in chilling First
Amendment freedoms. Nevertheless, the prior restraint doctrine
continues to be a fundamental aspect of First Amendment juris-
238prudence. However, as an examination of the Court's analysis
in Alexander v. United States aptly illustrates, reliance on the doc-
trine may infringe upon First Amendment rights, rather than uphold
them.
234. NIMMER, supra note 172, § 4.03, at 4-14. Nimmer writes:
The point is that engaging in speech activities contrary to a previously issued
administrative or judicial order in fact can at most give rise to subsequent
punishment. That is, the punishment is administered only after the act of
speech itself has already occurred. In that literal sense the censor's order and
the court's injunction result in a form of subsequent punishment no less than do
statutory penalties for speech activities which are not accompanied by such in
personam directives. If such personally directed orders are thought of as prior
restraints because of the chilling effect on the speaker which occurs prior to his
engaging in speech, then the distinction is at most one of degree.
Id.
235. Mayton, supra note 168, at 276.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 126, at 437 (calling for the abolishment of the
prior restraint doctrine); Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168,
at 729-30 (suggesting that a "chilling effect" analysis should replace the prior restraint
doctrine); Mayton, supra note 168, at 281 (concluding that systems of subsequent punish-
ment incur greater costs to free speech than injunctions).
238. See supra notes 135-67 and accompanying text.
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IV. ALEXANDER V. UNITED STATES
During the 1992 Term, the United States Supreme Court heard
Alexander v. United States.239 The defendant, Ferris J. Alexander,
was convicted under RICO for obscenity violations. The govern-
ment subsequently seized his adult entertainment business, includ-
ing his entire stock of films, videos, and publications, pursuant to
RICO's forfeiture laws. 240 Alexander brought a challenge to the
RICO forfeiture order, arguing that the forfeiture violated his First
and Eighth Amendment rights.24' The Court ruled, in upholding
the order, that the forfeiture did not constitute an impermissible
prior restraint and did not violate the First Amendment.242 Howev-
er, the Court remanded the case to determine whether the forfeiture
violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.243
A. Facts of Alexander
Alexander was in the adult entertainment business for over
thirty years, selling sexually explicit magazines and sexual para-
phernalia. 244 He also showed pornographic movies at his establish-
ments and eventually sold and rented videotapes of the same gen-
re.245 He received shipments of these materials at a warehouse in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and his products were then sold through
his 13 retail stores in a number of Minnesota cities.246 Alexander's
business generated millions of dollars annually;247 at the time of the
seizure his assets were valued at over $9 million dollars.248
In 1989, federal authorities filed a 41-count indictment against
Alexandei.24 9 The indictment charged, inter alia, 34 obscenity
239. 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
240. Id. at 2770.
241. Id. at 2769.
242. Id. at 2766.
243. Id. at 2776.
244. id. at 2769.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2770.
249. Id. at 2669.
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counts and 3 RICO counts predicated on the obscenity charges.25°
After a four-month jury trial, Alexander was convicted of 17 sub-
stantive obscenity offenses: 12 counts of transporting obscene ma-
terial in interstate commerce for the purpose of sale or distribu-
tion,25" ' and five counts of engaging in the business of selling ob-
scene material.252 He was also convicted of three RICO offenses
predicated on the obscenity convictions. 3 The jury's findings that
four magazines and three videotapes were obscene provided the
basis for the obscenity and RICO convictions.254 The Supreme
Court noted that "[m]ultiple copies of these magazines and videos,
which graphically depicted a variety of 'hard core' sexual acts,
were distributed throughout petitioner's adult entertainment em-
pire." 25
5
Alexander was sentenced to six years in prison and fined
$100,000.256 In addition, the district court reconvened the same
jury and held a forfeiture proceeding pursuant to RICO's forfeiture
provision, § 1963(a)(2).257 The jury determined that Alexander
utilized his interest in 10 pieces of commercial real estate and 31
current and former businesses to conduct his racketeering enter-
prise.258 As a result, the district court ordered Alexander to forfeit
his wholesale and retail businesses, including the books, magazines
and videos sold by these businesses, and almost $9 million ac-
quired through his racketeering activity. 9
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
250. Id.
251. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
252. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2769-70; see 18 U.S.C. § 1466.
253. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70. Defendant was convicted of one count of
receiving and using income derived from a pattern of racketeering activity, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a); one count of conducting a RICO enterprise, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(c); and one count of conspiring to conduct a RICO enterprise, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d). Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2769-70.
254. Id. at 2770.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. For the district court's Order and Judgment of Forfeiture, see United States
v. Alexander, No. 4-89-85, 1990 WL 117882 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 1990).
258. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
259. Id. The Supreme Court noted that the government, not wishing to go into the
business of selling pornographic materials, decided to destroy the forfeited expressive
materials. Id. at 2770 n. 1.
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court's forfeiture order,260 rejecting Alexander's contention that the
application of RICO's forfeiture provisions constituted a prior re-
straint in violation of the First Amendment. 26' The court of appeals
held that the forfeiture was a permissible criminal sanction imposed
as a subsequent punishment for defendant's RICO violations.262
The court also rejected Alexander's claim that the forfeiture provi-
sions were unconstitutionally overbroad.263 Finally, the circuit
court rejected the defendant's claim that the forfeiture provisions
violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" and "excessive fines. '' 6
B. The Supreme Court's Decision
1. The Majority Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority and joined by
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, first examined Alex-
ander's claim that the forfeiture of the business constituted an un-
constitutional prior restraint.265 Foregoing a functional approach
and applying, instead, a formalistic analysis, the Chief Justice held
that "[t]he term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when issued
in advance of the time that such communications are to occur.'
266
The Court then pointed to temporary restraining orders and perma-
nent injunctions as "classic examples of prior restraints. 2 67 Distin-
guishing Near v. Minnesota,268 Organization for a Better Austin v.
Keefe, 269 and Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 270 the Court held
that the state action in these cases was impermissible because it
had forbidden expressive activity in the future or had required prior
260. Alexander v. Thornburg, 943 F.2d 825, 836 (8th Cir. 1991), affd in part and
remanded in part sub nom. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766 (1993).
261. Alexander, 943 F.2d at 834.
262. Id.
263. ld. at 835.
264. Id. at 836.
265. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770-71.
266. Id. at 2771 (quoting NIMMER, supra note 172, § 4.03, at 4-14).
267. Id. (citing NIMMER, supra note 172, § 4.03, at 4-16).
268. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
269. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
270. 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam).
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approval for the expressive activity in question.271 In Near, for
example, the Court held that a state law providing for a permanent
injunction against a newspaper or periodical found to be a public
nuisance for producing a "malicious, scandalous and defamatory" '272
publication, was an unconstitutional prior restraint.27 3 Similarly, in
Vance, the Court struck down as an unconstitutional prior restraint
a Texas statute authorizing injunctions of indefinite duration pro-
hibiting theaters to exhibit films, upon a showing that the theater
had shown obscene films in the past.274 In distinguishing Alexan-
der, the Court held that the RICO forfeiture order did not prohibit
the defendant from engaging in any expressive activities in the
future, nor did the order require him to obtain prior approval for
any expressive activities.2 75 Notwithstanding his imprisonment and
the confiscation of his business, the Court noted that the defendant
was free to "open new stores, restock his inventory, . . . hire staff
.. [and] go back into the adult entertainment business tomorrow,
* . .sell[ing] as many sexually explicit magazines and videotapes
as he likes, without any risk of being held in contempt for violating
a court order., 276 In short, the Court held that "[u]nlike the injunc-
tions in Near, Keefe, and Vance, the forfeiture order in this case
imposes no legal impediment to-no prior restraint on-petitioner's
ability to engage in any expressive activity he chooses. ' 277
Chief Justice Rehnquist then distinguished Alexander from
those cases in which the government had seized materials suspected
of being obscene absent a prior judicial determination that they
were in fact obscene.278 The seized magazines, books, videos and
271. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
272. Near, 283 U.S. at 702.
273. Id. at 722-23.
274. Vance, 445 U.S. at 311.
275. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
276. Id. Provided he could find the capital, as well as the courage, to re-enter the
same line of business, the defendant would perhaps not have to worry himself about being
held in contempt. He would, however, likely be more than a little concerned about
incurring another RICO violation. This highlights the essential problem with the prior
restraint-subsequent punishment distinction. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying
text.
277. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2771.
278. Id. at 2771-72 (citing Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961); Bantam
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films in Alexander were forfeited not because they were believed
to be obscene, but because they were related to the defendant's past
racketeering violations.27 9 The Chief Justice observed that "[t]he
statute is oblivious to the expressive or nonexpressive nature of the
assets forfeited; books, sports cars, narcotics, and cash are all for-
feitable alike under RICO. 28 °
The Supreme Court found, moreover, that the assets were not
seized without affording the defendant the proper procedural safe-
guards.28 ' The Court noted that in Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indi-
ana 282 a pretrial seizure of certain expressive material, based on a
probable cause finding that a RICO violation had occurred, was
held unconstitutional.28 3 However, the Alexander Court held that
Fort Wayne Books turned on the fact that there had been no prior
judicial determination that the seized items were obscene or that
there had been an underlying RICO violation.284 Quoting Fort
Wayne Books, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that "[m]ere
probable cause to believe a legal violation ha[d] transpired ... is
not adequate to remove books or films from circulation., 28 1 In the
instant case, however; the defendant had a full criminal trial on the
merits of the obscenity and RICO charges, in which the govern-
ment had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the basis for the
forfeiture.286
The majority's opinion also relied on Arcara v. Cloud Books,
Inc.287 for the proposition that expressive activities could be re-
stricted if in the form of a subsequent punishment.88 In Arcara,
the Court sustained a lower court order, issued under a general
nuisance statute, that closed down an adult bookstore that was
Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Vance, 445 U.S. 308).
279. Id. at 2772.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. 489 U.S. 46 (1989).
283. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772 (citing Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66).
284. Id.
285. Id. (quoting Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 66).
286. Id.
287. 478 U.S. 697 (1986).
288. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
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being used as a place of prostitution and lewdness.2"9 The Court
in Alexander noted that the Arcara Court based its decision on two
considerations in rejecting the defendant's claim that the state ac-
tion had amounted to an improper prior restraint. First, the closure
of the bookstore imposed no prior restraint at all on the dissemina-
tion of particular materials, "since respondents [were] free to carry
on their bookselling business at another location ...."9 Second,
the closure order was not "imposed on the basis of an advance
determination that the distribution of particular materials [was]
prohibited ..... 291 The Alexander Court held that the same rea-
soning applied in the instant case.2 92 Namely, "the RICO forfeiture
order was not a prior restraint on speech, but a punishment for past
criminal conduct. '293  The defendant's attempts to distinguish
Arcara on the grounds that obscenity, unlike prostitution or lewd-
ness, has significant expressive elements, was to no avail. 294 The
Court held that this distinction had no bearing on the issue of
whether the forfeiture was an impermissible prior restraint.295
The Court next looked to the historical antecedents of the First
Amendment's distinction between prior restraint and subsequent
punishment. 296 The Court maintained that accepting the defendant's
First Amendment challenge would "undermine the time-honored
distinction between barring speech in the future and penalizing past
speech.297 While acknowledging that American jurisprudence has
given a broader definition to prior restraint than traditional common
law, the Court nonetheless held that preserving the distinction be-
tween prior restraint and subsequent punishment was "critical to
our First Amendment jurisprudence. '298
289. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 699-700.
290. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. 2772 (quoting Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 n.2).
291. Id. (quoting Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705 n.2).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2772-73.
295. Id. at 2773.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. Since the forfeiture was judged to be a subsequent punishment, the Court
analyzed the seizure under "normal First Amendment standards." Id. The Court main-
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Chief Justice Rehnquist also dismissed the defendant's over-
breadth argument, contending it was in actuality a challenge to the
improper "chilling" effect such a statute would have. 299 The Chief
Justice did not doubt that RICO's severe forfeiture provisions
would "induce cautious booksellers to practice self-censorship and
remove marginally protected materials from their shelves . . .,,"'
The Court held, however, that deterring the sale of obscene materi-
als was constitutionally permissible and that any obscenity statute
would "induce some tendency to self-censorship and have some
inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not obscene. '"301
Finally, the Court rejected the defendant's challenge that the
statute targeted expressive activity and, in so doing, unconstitution-
ally proscribed protected speech. °2 Citing Arcara, the Court ruled
that:
criminal and civil sanctions having some incidental effect
on First Amendment activities are subject to First Amend-
ment scrutiny "only where it was conduct with a significant
expressive element that drew the legal remedy in the first
place, as in United States v. O'Brien or where a statute
based on a nonexpressive activity has the inevitable effect
of singling out those engaged in expressive activity, as in
Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of
Revenue ."303
Acknowledging that the conduct the legal sanctions proscribed
tained that First Amendment challenges to the imposition of severe prison sentences and
fines for obscenity convictions had been rejected in the past: "the First Amendment does
not prohibit either stringent criminal sanctions for obscenity offenses or forfeiture of
expressive materials as punishment for criminal conduct." Id.
299. Id. at 2774.
300. Id. The Court stated here that the hypothetical booksellers would be motivated
out of a fear that marginally protected materials could be deemed obscene and thus
subject to RICO's forfeiture laws. Id. However, much more than "marginally protected
materials" would be in jeopardy of forfeiture. The booksellers entire stock, including
whatever assets were tainted by the "corrupted enterprise" would be subject to forfeiture.
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
301. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774.
302. id. at 2774-75.
303. Id. (citations omitted).
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had expressive elements, the Court nevertheless held that those
expressive elements were insufficient to trigger First Amendment
scrutiny. The Court emphasized that "'obscenity' can be regulated
or actually proscribed consistent with the First Amendment. ' 30
4
2. The Dissent
Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent, was joined by Justices
Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Souter also joined as to Part 11.305
The dissent denounced the majority's opinion as "a deplorable
abandonment of fundamental First Amendment principles. ' 3°  Ad-
monishing the majority for it's elevation of form over -substance,
the dissent urged a more functional approach to the prior restraint
doctrine. °7 Justice Kennedy argued that in order to protect impor-
tant First Amendment values an analysis of the proscription's oper-
ation and effect was necessary rather than a mere examination of
304. Id. The Court went on to analyze the defendant's Eighth Amendment claims
and eventually remanded the case to the court of appeals for consideration of whether the
forfeiture violated the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. id. at 2775-76. The
"excessive" nature of RICO's forfeiture laws is certainly relevant to potentially impermis-
sible "chilling effects" of RICO. This potential excessiveness reveals the weakness of a
more formalistic prior restraint-subsequent punishment analysis. Id. However, the
Court's discussion of Alexander's Eighth Amendment challenge sheds little light on the
issues raised in this Comment and, therefore, is beyond its scope. Id.
305. Id. at 2776 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, concurring in part and
dissenting in part, filed a brief separate opinion, in which he indicated he agreed with the
majority that the forfeiture did not constitute a prior restraint, as traditionally understood.
Id. (Souter, J., concurring in part dissenting in part). However, Justice Souter, in joining
Part II of the dissent, also stated that "the First Amendment forbids the forfeiture of
petitioner's expressive material in the absence of an adjudication that it is obscene or
otherwise of unprotected character." id.
306. Id. at 2786. Justice Kennedy stated:
The Court today embraces a rule that would find no affront to the First Amend-
ment in the Government's destruction of a book and film business and its entire
inventory of legitimate expression as punishment for a single past speech of-
fense. Until now I had thought one could browse through any book or film
store in the United States without fear that the proprietor had chosen each item
to avoid risk to the whole inventory and indeed to the business itself. This
ominous, onerous threat undermines free speech and press principles essential
to our personal freedom.
Id. at 2776.
307. See id. at 2782-83.
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its form.30
The dissent noted that since the First Amendment's conception,
the prior restraint doctrine has been characterized by an expansion
of English common law's traditional notion of the doctrine.3°9 The
dissent also took issue with the majority's reading of the seminal
prior restraint case, Near v. Minnesota.310 According to the dissent,
Near was a case in which the Court was faced with state action
that did not fall within the traditional notions of prior restraint, yet
posed many of the same censorship dangers.3 ' In that case, how-
ever, the Court held that the doctrine did not apply only to tradi-
tional forms of prior restraints, such as licensing and prior censor-
ship.31 2 Instead, the Court extended the doctrine to apply to "in-
junctive systems which threaten or bar future speech based on
some past infraction., 31 3  In short, the dissent argued that Near
stood for the proposition that the First Amendment requires more
than an examination of the regulation's form; the First Amendment
requires an examination of the regulation's "operation and effect on
the suppression of speech. 31 4
Moreover, the dissent asserted that matters of form were incon-
sequential in the face of RICO's broad sweep.315  Underscoring
RICO's effects, Justice Kennedy stated that "[w]hat is happening
here is simple: Books and films are condemned and destroyed not
for their own content but for the content of their owner's prior
speech. Our law does not permit the government to burden future
308. See id. at 2783.
309. Id. at 2780-82. Part III of this Comment discusses the history of the prior
restraint doctrine, to which Justice Kennedy refers. See supra part III.A.
310. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
311. Id. at 2782-83.
312. Id. at 2783.
313. Id.
314. id. at 2782 (citing Near, 283 U.S. at 708). Justice Kennedy observed that "[t]he
cited cases identify a progression in our First Amendment jurisprudence which results
from a more fundamental principle. As governments try new ways to subvert essential
freedoms, legal and constitutional systems respond by making more explicit the nature
and the extent of the liberty in question." Id. at 2782-83.
315. Id. at 2783.
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speech for this sort of taint."3"6 The dissent also rebuked the Court
for its formalistic analysis of the prior restraint doctrine. The dis-
sent noted that the majority determined that the forfeiture was not
a prior restraint and then abandoned any further substantive analy-
sis of the defendant's First Amendment rights.317 Justice Kennedy
retorted: "The rights of free speech and press in their broad and
legitimate sphere cannot be defeated by the simple expedient of
punishing after in lieu of censoring before. 318
The dissent distinguished RICO's forfeiture provisions from
more traditional criminal sanctions.319 Justice Kennedy noted that
RICO's purpose is "to destroy or incapacitate the offending enter-
prise ... ."320 Quoting Justice Stevens' concurrence in Fort Wayne
Books, the dissent maintained that RICO's forfeiture provisions
"arm prosecutors not with scalpels to excise obscene portions of an
adult bookstore's inventory but with sickles to mow down the en-
tire undesired use."32'
Justice Kennedy contended that, even if the forfeiture did not
constitute a prior restraint, it nonetheless violated the First Amend-
ment.322 Justice Kennedy asserted that upholding the massive sei-
zure of materials that had not been adjudged obscene was without
"parallel in our cases. 323 Citing a line of pretrial search and sei-
zure cases in which the Court mandated special protections for
presumptively protected expression, Justice Kennedy stated that
"we have been careful to say that First Amendment materials can-
316. Id. at 2783-84.
317. Id. at 2779.
318. Id. at 2783. Justice Kennedy stated, "[i]f mere warning against sale of certain
materials was a prior restraint, I fail to see why the physical destruction of a speech
enterprise and its protected inventory is not condemned by the same doctrinal principles."
Id. at 2782 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58
(1963)).
319. Id. at 2783.
320. Id. Justice Kennedy stated: "The admitted design and the overt purpose of the
forfeiture in this case are to destroy an entire speech business and all its protected titles,
thus depriving the public of access to lawful expression." Id. at 2779.
321. Id. at 2784 (quoting Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 85 (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)).
322. See id. at 2785.
323. Id.
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not be taken out of circulation until they have been determined to
be unlawful. 324 He further asserted that these prior decisions had
held that in the case of interim seizures "one title does not become
seizable or tainted because of its proximity on the shelf to anoth-
er."325 The dissent also argued that the permanent destruction of
protected materials required even greater protection: "[W]hile in
the past we invalidated seizures which resulted in a temporary
removal of presumptively protected materials from circulation,
today the Court approves of government measures having the same
permanent effect. 326 Justice Kennedy observed that the majority
was willing to give less protection to the permanent forfeiture of
materials than the Court, in prior cases, had consistently given to
materials only temporarily seized.327 The dissent thus argued that
regardless of whether it was a prior restraint or subsequent punish-
ment, the permanent forfeiture of protected materials violated the
First Amendment as had the temporary seizure of such materials.328
V. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION IN ALEXANDER
A. The Prior Restraint-Subsequent Punishment Distinction as
Applied to Obscenity
The Supreme Court, in Alexander, held that the seizure of the
defendant's nonobscene material under RICO's forfeiture provi-
sions was constitutionally permissible. 329 However, in distinguish-
ing RICO's forfeiture provisions from traditional forms of prior re-
straints, the Court failed to consider the very dangers which the
prior restraint doctrine attempts to check. Simply put, the prior
restraint doctrine serves to ensure that materials protected by the
First Amendment reach the marketplace of ideas.33° Two distinct
324. Id. (citing Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 63; Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York,
442 U.S. 319, 326 n.5 (1979); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731-33 (1961);
A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 211-13; Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470 (1985)).
325. Id.
326. Id. at 2786.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. See supra part IV.B.
330. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
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interests are implicated by such a paradigm. First,, government
regulations that obstruct the free exchange of protected materials
affect the First Amendment rights of the speaker. Second, and just
as importantly, such proscriptions affect the rights of the audience
as well.
1. The First Amendment Rights of the Speaker
The Court's analysis in Alexander underscores one of the chief
defects of the prior restraint doctrine. In addressing the particular
form of the government proscription rather than its substantive
aspects, the doctrine fails to consider the proscription's effect on
protected speech.33' The doctrine analyzes the timing of the gov-
ernment regulation rather than the extent of the regulation.3
Indeed, the Alexander Court's application of the prior restraint
doctrine proved to be inadequate in addressing the substantive issue
in the case. The Court's analysis failed to consider the "operation
and effect" of the regulation vis-A-vis presumptively protected ma-
terials.333 To state that the forfeiture of the materials was a permis-
sible subsequent punishment for a past infraction neglects to ad-
dress the critical question: Did the government action suppress
protected materials to such an extent that it transgressed First
Amendment liberties? As the dissent in Alexander noted, the ma-
jority labeled the forfeiture a subsequent punishment, then "dis-
misse[d] any further debate over the constitutionality of the forfei-
ture penalty under the First Amendment., 33
4
A system of prior restraints may be less oppressive for certain
classes of communications than a system of subsequent punish-
ment. Such is the case for those classes of speech that do not
provide the speaker with clear guidelines as to what constitutes
proscribed speech.335 Prior restraints afford guidance to the speaker
before he has transgressed the government's proscription. 336 Subse-
331. See -supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
333. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2783 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 2779.
335. See supra notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 224-25 and accompanying text.
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quent punishment, on the other hand, takes effect once the commu-
nication is uttered and the law has been violated. .A speaker sub-
jected to an especially vague statute enforced by subsequent pun-
ishment may not realize his transgression until a prosecution has
commenced.337 Such prior guidance may be especially welcome in
an area of First Amendment jurisprudence such as obscenity. Ap-
plied to obscenity, prior restraints may actually be less restrictive
than subsequent punishment.338
For example, a purveyor of adult videos would likely prefer a
system of prior restraint that indicated in advance those videos he
could legally sell and those he could not. 339 . Upon the issuance of
an injunction that proscribed specific titles, he could then go about
selling the merchandise not enumerated in the injunction with the
knowledge that he was within the constraints of the law. A system
of subsequent punishment, on the other hand, provides the hypo-
thetical adult-video seller no advance notice that he has violated the
law. Even a conscientious, law-abiding distributor would not know
he had violated the law until a prosecution was brought against
him.
In addition, the severity of the subsequent punishment is critical
in determining its effect on both proscribed and protected commu-
nication.34° Where the subsequent punishment is insignificant, it
may be discounted as a cost of doing business.34' In that case the
prior restraint may act as a more repressive regime. However,
where the subsequent punishment is severe, violation of the law
may result in silencing not only the transgressor's future speech,
but the entire class of speech from whence the original communica-
tion came.342 Thus, severe sanctions would discourage the convict-
337. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168, at 699 n.65.
338. See supra note 213.
339. See Mayton, supra note 168, at 271 n.164 (citing cases in which publishers
sought declaratory relief rather than risk subsequent punishment).
340. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168, at 698 & nn.
61-62.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 699; see also NIMMER, supra note 172, § 4:04, at 4-21. Nimmer writes
that "[a] statute restricting speech, which holds out the threat of subsequent punishment
for its violation will tend to chill the speech of the public at large. An injunction on
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ed adult-video seller from future distribution. Moreover, other
sellers fearing such sanctions would also be constrained in the
distribution of not only proscribed material, but protected material
as well.343
Consequently, RICO's severe forfeiture provisions encroach
upon the defendant's First Amendment rights in a number of ways.
First, the pecuniary penalty would have the dual effect of disabling
the defendant's distribution facilities, as well as convincing him to
steer clear of speech that would result in significant economic sanc-
tions. The Alexander Court, however, held that neither of these
effects were enough to implicate the First Amendment. 344  The
Court noted that the First Amendment did not prohibit severe crim-
inal penalties for obscenity cases.3 45 Moreover, the Court held that
any chilling effect induced in other booksellers by the removal of
"marginally protected materials" was permissible,346 because deter-
ring the sale of obscene materials "is a legitimate end of state
antiobscenity laws. ' 347  However, RICO's severe sanctions deter
more than the sale of obscene materials. The provisions will sig-
nificantly impact sexually explicit speech that approaches the hazy
line of the Miller obscenity standards, as distributors are likely to
remove materials that are not legally obscene.
Aside from the monetary effects that would act to chill or stifle
the distribution of sexually explicit material, the distributor's rights
are restricted when he is prevented from distributing protected
speech activities is by its nature directed to specified persons, and as such would not
'throttle' all others." Id.
343. See Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note 168, at 699.
344. See supra notes 302-04 and accompanying text.
345. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2773 (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S.
463, 464-65 n.2 (1966); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 296 n.3 (1977); Fort
Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 59 n.8 (1988)).
346. Id. at 2774; see also Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment, supra note
168 (discussing the chilling effect doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence).
347. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2774 (quoting Fort Wayne Books, 489 U.S. at 60). The
Court went on to state that "our cases have long recognized the practical reality that 'any
form of criminal obscenity statute applicable to a bookseller will induce some tendency
to self-censorship and have some inhibitory effect on the dissemination of material not
obscene."' Id.
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materials by the government's confiscation of those materials. The
Alexander Court discounted this argument. The Court analogized
the forfeiture of the defendant's inventory of books, magazines, and
videos to the injunction forcing the closure of the bookstore in
Arcara.348 The Court stated that in Arcara it upheld the closure of
a business engaged in expressive activity as a punishment for crim-
inal conduct. 349 The Court reasoned, therefore, that "forfeiture of
expressive materials as punishment for criminal conduct" was con-
sistent with the First Amendment.35°
Arcara, however, can be distinguished on several grounds. The
conduct that received the government sanction in Arcara was not
speech-related,351 whereas the RICO provisions in Alexander were
directed at speech, albeit, ostensibly unprotected speech. Addition-
ally, Arcara did not involve the seizure of protected materials. The
defendant's store was closed by a court order, however, the materi-
als he sold were not seized.3 52 Thus, the defendant in Arcara was
free to distribute his materials at another location.353 Alexander, on
the other hand, does not have the same option, as the government
destroyed his entire inventory. 4
2. The First Amendment Rights of the Audience
The Alexander Court employed the prior restraint doctrine in
analyzing RICO's forfeiture provisions in relation to the First
Amendment rights of the distributor. In so doing, the Court ne-
glected to take into account the First Amendment rights of the
audience. However, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that in
addition to the speaker's rights, a First Amendment right also in-
heres in the audience. 5 The First Amendment "'serves significant
348. See supra notes 287-95 and accompanying text.
349. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
350. See Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2775.
351. See id. at 2779; The Supreme Court, 1992 Term-Leading Cases, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 144, 244-50 (1993) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
352. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 705.
353. Id.
354. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2785.
355. NIMMER, supra note 172, § 1.02(F)(1), at 1-20 & nn.34, 37 (citing Supreme
Court cases upholding the First Amendment rights of the audience in receiving informa-
tion). Nimmer notes, however, that in many instances the audience's rights may be
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societal interests' wholly apart from the speaker's interest in self-
expression.... [T]he First Amendment protects the public's inter-
est in receiving information. 356 Accordingly, the public has the
same right of access to sexually explicit materials that have not
been judged obscene. As the Court in Stanley v. Georgia357 held,
"[t]his right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth is fundamental to our free society. 358
Hence, in cases involving the pretrial seizure of First Amend-
ment materials, the Court has required an adversarial hearing re-
garding the issue of obscenity before all the copies of expressive
materials could be seized. The Court in Marcus and A Quantity of
Books reasoned that massive seizures conducted prior to a judicial
hearing as to their obscenity threatened the public's right to "unob-
structed circulation of nonobscene books., 359  However, the Court
divorced its holdings from this rationale in subsequent cases.
While the Court has consistently reaffirmed that an adversarial
hearing was necessary before massive seizures could be undertaken,
vindicated only when the speaker is allowed to assert a First Amendment claim or de-
fense. id. at 1-22.
356. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)
(holding that order from Public Utilities Commission requiring utility to place newsletter
from third party in its billing envelopes violated utility's First Amendment rights); see
also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the
public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and
experiences which is crucial here.").
357. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
358. id. at 564 (citation omitted). However, since Stanley, the Court has cut back
the public's right to receive sexually explicit materials, particularly where those materials
have been judged obscene. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) ("[T]o equate
the free and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with commercial exploitation
of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the First Amendment and its high
purposes in the historic struggle for freedom."); see also Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (5-4) (upholding the use of zoning ordinances restricting the
exhibition of "adult" films); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1972) (5-4)
(upholding the use of civil proceedings to enjoin films that had been adjudged obscene
upon an adversary hearing); cf. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part) ("The primary concern of the free speech guarantee is that there be
full opportunity for expression in all of its varied forms to convey a desired message.
Vital to this concern is the corollary that there be full opportunity for everyone to receive
the message.").
359. See A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 213 (1964).
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in later cases the Court framed the issue as a question of improper
prior restraints. 360 This trend culminated in Alexander, where the
Court analyzed the seizure in the context of the prior restraint doc-
trine, and completely ignored the rationale of Marcus and A Quan-
tity of Books. Determining that an adversarial hearing was afforded
the defendant, the Alexander Court held that the presumptively
protected materials could be seized.3 6' However, the requirement
of an adversarial proceeding was meant to protect the public's First
Amendment rights as much as the defendant's.
Nowhere did the Court analyze RICO's forfeiture in relation to
the First Amendment rights of the public. The Court concluded
that the RICO forfeiture provision is "oblivious to the expressive
or nonexpressive nature of the assets forfeited. 362 While "books,
sports cars, narcotics, and cash" are all forfeitable under RICO,3 63
only the forfeiture of books and other expressive materials affects
the public's First Amendment right in the unobstructed circulation
of such materials. Indeed, by disabling distribution facilities and
seizing their inventories, the goal of RICO's forfeiture provisions
is apparent: it seeks to suppress the circulation of sexually explicit
materials, "thus depriving the public of access to [this] lawful ex-
pression.364
Had the Court analyzed RICO's forfeiture provisions in relation
to the public's First Amendment rights, the distinction made be-
tween prior restraints and subsequent punishment would be of little
consequence. The seizure of Alexander's inventory would have
been struck down, as the removal of protected materials from circu-
lation clearly infringes upon the public's right of access to such
materials. Consequently, the government's use of RICO in Alexan-
der violated the First Amendment regardless of its characterization
as a prior restraint or subsequent punishment.
360. See supra notes 95, 105 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 285-86 and accompanying text.
362. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2772.
363. Id.
364. Id. at 2779.
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B. An Alternative Approach
Once the public's right of access has been recognized in RICO
forfeitures of expressive material, an appropriate standard of review
must be determined. Assuming RICO is a facially neutral statute,
in that assets irrespective of their speech qualities are subject to
seizure, its effects on speech require a heightened level of constitu-
tional scrutiny. Content-neutral regulations that have a secondary
effect on speech implicate the intermediate level of First Amend-
ment scrutiny offered in United States v. O'Brien.365 The Court in
O 'Brien required that a "content-neutral" statute indirectly restrict-
ing speech must meet a four-part test. First, the regulation must be
"within the constitutional power of the Government. ' 366 Second,
the regulation must further "an important or substantial governmen-
tal interest., 367 Third, "the governmental interest" must be "unre-
lated to the suppression of free expression., 368 Finally, "the inci-
dental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [must be]
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 369
Applying O'Brien to RICO's forfeiture laws, the government
provision possibly fails two of the four prongs. It is unassailable
that the government has the right to criminalize obscenity. More-
over, the government has a "substantial interest" in combatting
organized crime and obscenity. However, the forfeiture provision
in Alexander arguably fails to meet the requirement that the gov-
ernment interest served is "unrelated to the suppression of speech."
Moreover, the provision fails to meet the requirement that its inci-
dental restrictions on speech are "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance" of the governmental interest.
365. 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see Leading Cases, supra note 351, at 248. Previous
commentators have also regarded the O'Brien test as applicable to RICO's forfeiture
provisions when applied to obscenity. See id. at 248 n.38 (citing Tod R. Eggenberger,
RICO vs. Dealers in Obscene Matter: The First Amendment Battle, 22 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 71, 102-07 (1988); Glenn Rudolph, Comment, RICO: The Predicate Offense
of Obscenity, the Seizure of Adult Bookstore Assets, and the First Amendment, 15 N. KY.
L. REV. 585, 604 & nn.19-20 (1988)).
366. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id.
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The government had three identifiable interests in applying
RICO to obscenity violations. These interests were enumerated by
Senator Helms as he offered his amendment to RICO, making its
forfeiture provisions applicable to obscenity violations.3 70 First, he
sought to make investigation and prosecution of organized crime's
involvement in the "illicit sex industry" more effective.37' Second,
the proffered provision was meant to hinder the proliferation of
obscene matter.372 These two interests are "unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression." However, a third identifiable interest
is related to presumptively free expression. Senator Helms stated
that RICO was intended to do more than eradicate obscenity and
organized crime's proceeds from it. He hoped that the amendment
would eliminate the "scourge" of pornography.373 However, much
of the material within the class of expression identified as pornog-
raphy may not be legally obscene. Hence, pornography that is not
deemed obscene is presumptively protected by the First Amend-
ment. This third interest, therefore, is related to the "suppression
of free expression."
The RICO forfeiture provision fails the fourth prong of O'Brien
as well. The forfeiture in this instance acts to restrict protected
materials far beyond what is necessary in order to effectuate even
its legitimate interests of combatting obscenity and organized
crime. RICO's harsh sanctions provide for vast forfeitures for
relatively minor obscenity violations. In Alexander, for instance,
the defendant was subject to a forfeiture in excess of nine million
dollars, including his entire inventory of books, magazines, and
films for obscenity violations stemming from four magazines and
three videotapes.374
A number of commentators, as well as the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, have proposed that a proportionality requirement
should be read into RICO when it is applied to obscenity convic-
370. See Statement of Sen. Helms, supra note 37, at 844.
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Alexander, 113 S. Ct. at 2770.
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tions. 3 5  As one commentator has suggested, an effective tailoring
of RICO could be accomplished by simply limiting its forfeiture
provisions to "the obscene material itself, the assets directly in-
volved in its creation and distribution, and the proceeds stemming
directly from its sale or distribution., 376 A more narrowly tailored
statute would effectuate the government's legitimate non-speech
interests while ensuring that protected expression remained inviola-
ble.377 As the Court noted in A Quantity of Books, "[t]he line be-
tween speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may
legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn.
. . ."378 Thus, narrowing the reach of RICO's forfeiture provisions
where obscenity and other speech-related activities are the predicate
offense would provide the Court with the "sensitive tools" neces-
sary for "separation of legitimate from illegitimate speech ....
CONCLUSION
RICO has proven to be an effective tool in fighting organized
375. See Adult Video Ass'n v. Barr, 960 F.2d 781, 790-92 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated
sub nom. Reno v. Adult Video Ass'n, 113 S. Ct. 3028 (1993); O'Donnell, supra note 4,
at 1123-26; Leading Cases, supra note 351, at 251-52; Vartan Aznavoorian, Using Racke-
teering Laws to Control Obscenity: Alexander v. United States and the Perversion of
RICO, 36 B.C. L. REV. 553, 584 (1995).
376. Leading Cases, supra note 351, at 251-52.
377. In Adult Video Ass'n, the Ninth Circuit, recognizing that the government had
a legitimate interest in disabling criminal enterprises, nonetheless held that narrowing the
scope of RICO in obscenity cases was necessary in order to protect the First Amendment
rights of the public, as well as the defendant. Adult Video Ass'n, 960 F.2d at 792. The
court of appeals went on to distinguish the countervailing interests involved in RICO
prosecutions that target obscenity and those that do not:
The forfeiture of assets derived from drugs, arson, fraud, and murder rarely, if
ever, implicates a public right of access to information. The forfeiture of assets
loosely affiliated with obscenity offenses, by contrast, hurts not just the defen-
dant, but also those members of the public who wish to obtain sexually explicit
and erotic videotapes. Government "is not free to adopt whatever procedures
it pleases for dealing with obscenity . . . without regard to the possible conse-
quences for constitutionally protected speech."
Id. (citations omitted).
378. A Quantity of Books, 378 U.S. at 212 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
525 (1958)).
379. Id.
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crime. Its forfeiture provisions have facilitated the government in
disgorging previously entrenched syndicates from areas that vitally
affect our nation. However, in approving the application of the
forfeiture laws to obscenity violations, the Supreme Court has al-
lowed the government to dangerously encroach upon the First
Amendment rights of both the distributor and the audience. The
government should not be able to do by way of punishment, what
it could not do as a prior restraint. Such adherence to form jeopar-
dizes exactly those values the First Amendment seeks to protect.

